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Root, Erik S., M.A. May 1995 Political Science
Presidential Management and Legislative Agendas: A Question of
Management Style {114 pp.)
Director: Michael J. Laslovich
The Executive Office of the President has grovm dramatically in 
responsibility and size since the Great Depression. It is important for 
presidents to organize their staff in a way that allows them to focus on 
the broad-based goals of the administration. To win Congressional 
support for his initiatives, presidents must utilize the Office of 
Congressional Relations (OCR) to lobby for the administration’s 
programs.
The proper organization of the OCR requires that the president 
takes time to communicate with his subordinates. A chief of staff must 
limit access to the president and take upon himself duties that ensure 
the president's wishes are being carried out.
The case study of the Carter administration's energy bill 
demonstrates that the President did not organize his staff in such a way 
as to increase the likelihood of the legislation's passage. Carter's 
reticence to engage his staff in a social exchange with Congress 
detrimentally slowed the legislative process. The resulting arduous and 
lengthy process contributed to the perception that the Carter 
administration was in disarray.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The office of the American Presidency has changed dramatically over 
time. In response to increased public expectations of the president, 
executive responsibility has also multiplied. The growth of White House 
staff is a principal consequence of this change. As demands on the 
president to solve the nation's problems increase, so too does his 
reliance on staff. Staffers are intricately involved in policy 
advising, policy making, and the development and implementation of 
political strategy in pursuit of the president's agenda.^ The expanding 
role of staffers has required an increase in their numbers, which in
turn complicates the president's task of coordinating his legislative 
2program.
This tJiesis contends that a president's ability to pass his 
legislative agenda is partially dependent on how he organizes and 
manages his staff. It centers on the presidential management of staff 
and how it affects the passage of legislation through Congress. The 
historical evolution of the president's staff is discussed to 
demonstrate the importance and necessity of staff support. President 
Jimmy Carter's general management of the White House staff, and in 
particular the effect his style had on the Congressional Liaison Staff's 
ability to lobby Capitol Hill, is of particular interest. The manner 
the chief executive directs his staffers influences the overall 
legislative success of the administration. The president's management 
skills are critical.^ The chief executive's failure to get what he
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
wants from the disparate congressional membership results in an 
ineffective administration.
Congress and the public have both turned to the president for 
answers to complex problems facing society in the modern era. With the 
Great Depression, the people turned to the president in hopes he could 
alleviate the poor economic times. Given these expectations, much of 
the legislation considered by Congress is now proposed by the chief 
executive.* Since the president is the prime initiator and coordinator 
of the government, executive officials also anticipate presidential 
direction and guidance on how to implement policy.^ The management and 
organization of the White House staff also provides the administration 
with the ability to meet the increasing responsibilities of the 
executive office.
As the United States government's responsibilities grew, the 
president's tasks and duties became increasingly varied. While the 
chief executive's job has always been too large for one person, this 
growth made his tasks even more difficult to accomplish. Staff 
assistance is needed to promote the administration's policies on Capitol 
Hill. Promoting the president's programs to Congress helps the White 
House maintain linkages with legislators and foster a congenial working 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches.
The president's first responsibility regarding his staff, then, is 
to organize and mobilize the executive branch to address those tasks. 
This point is especially important if the chief executive wants to 
pursue an agenda that breaks from the past, since new policy directions 
are often met with resistance from Congress and interest groups.
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Given this inevitable resistance to his policies the ability for 
the president to have his staff organized before the term begins becomes 
even more important. The chief executive must make a successful 
transition from campaigning to governing in order to increase the 
chances of legislative victories. However, successful transitions are 
difficult; what it takes to get elected president is quite different 
from governing. Richard Rose notes that because a candidate consumes 
himself with the arduous task of getting elected, he does not think much 
about what he is going to do once elected. But upon inauguration, the 
president should be able to "hit the ground running" to capitalize on 
his electoral victory.^ Since each administration potentially has only 
eight years to accomplish its goals, the president needs to have 
managerial control over his staff so he can coordinate his objectives.
A president who does not make a successful transition by preparing the 
White House staff will fail to achieve many of the goals of the 
administration.
Having the White House ready to "hit the ground running" also 
increases the likelihood that the administration can take advantage of 
the less contentious political atmosphere accompanying the outset of the 
term. At the moment of inauguration, the president has his greatest 
amount of support from the voters because they want the president to 
succeed.^ During this "honeymoon period," the president's 
relationship with Congress is also the least turbulent,® Legislators 
are tentatively open to the new president's leadership because the chief 
executive has not yet presented controversial legislation which a 
Congress member's constituents may dislike.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Members of Congress also tentatively welcome a new administration 
because the White House may pursue a bargaining relationship with 
Capitol Hill. Just as the president wants to pass legislation. Congress 
wants to push through their agenda. But an administration that does not 
seek out a congenial working relationship with Congress may alienate 
legislators. Members of Congress will feel unimportant and ignored by 
the administration if a relationship based on bargaining and compromise 
is not established. This relationship includes allowing legislators to 
have a say in White House proposals. Having a legislative staff working 
with members of Congress, building coalitions of support for 
initiatives, goes a long way toward ensuring legislative success.
Once offended, Capitol Hill will be less likely to support the 
chief executive's proposals throughout the administration's term. The 
ability to "hit the ground running" thus contributes to the White 
House's legislative effectiveness over the entirety of the 
administration's term. George Reedy, an aide to former President Lyndon 
Johnson, states that: "if the president gets along well with the
Congress in the beginning, he may be able to carry [support for his 
initiatives] past the initial period. But if he gets off on the wrong
Qfoot, he'll never be able to shake [the bad relationship]." Former 
White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman also notes the importance of 
the administration establishing a congenial connection with Capitol Hill 
is critical because as soon as the president takes office, his power 
begins eroding and the window of opportunity to pass legislation gets 
s m a l l e r. H al de ma n believes that it is inevitable that the chief 
executive's influence will diminish because at some point legislators 
will be alienated by the president's agenda. Therefore, to retard this
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diminishing executive influence, a president must seek out a good 
relationship with Congress to decrease the likelihood that early 
mistakes will hurt the president's chances for passage of initiatives in 
the future.
Given the benefits of organizing the executive staff organization 
to increase the president's legislative success, key research questions 
include;
1.How the management of staff affects the focus of the 
administration's staffers on the President's goals;
2. How the management of staff affects the likelihood of 
congressional passage of legislation; and
3. What lessons from the Carter administration are useful to the 
management and organization of future White House staffs.
The hypothesis in this examination asserts that the more direction 
presidents give staffers, the more successful their administrations will 
be at lobbying Congress. The clearer a president articulates what he 
wants to accomplish in office, the more focused the staff will be on the 
administration's goals. Conversely, a chief executive who does not 
guide his staff will find his administration in disarray. Without 
coordination, other members of the administration may propose 
legislation on Capitol Hill without the president's knowledge or 
support.
Operationalization and Scope
The elements of effective management have only been implied up to 
this point. For the purpose of this study, effective management 
purports three elements. First, enhancing legislative success requires
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that, the president articulates goals to his staff in a clear and 
prioritized fashion. Once the president articulates to his staff what 
he wants and expects, and what initiatives to pursue, the staff will be 
able to communicate coherently this information to Congress.
Conversely, confusion over what the president wants, and what issues 
should be addressed first, leaves the administration in disarray, and 
sends the Congress confusing and contradictory messages.
Second, presidents must direct staffers to lobby and bargain with 
members of Congress. To the extent that a president requires his 
congressional liaison staff to consult Congress on critical executive 
proposals, the chances for policy passage increases. If the president 
does not ensure his liaison staff maintains constant contact with 
legislators, and seeks their input on important legislation, 
presidential initiatives will most likely fail.
Third, the administration must be hierarchically organized to
ensure that staffers receive proper direction and work towards the
president's goals. This organizational structure allows the president
to remain focused on the most important issues confronting the 
12administration. The chief executive does not have time to address 
every policy issue, and therefore must rely on staff to investigate 
problems, review policy options, and carry out his wishes. A clearly 
defined chain of command decreases the possibility that staffers will 
stray from the administration's goals to pursue a personal ideological 
agenda antithetical to the president's goals.
One way to help avoid these organizational problems is to utilize a 
chief of staff. One of the duties of a chief of staff is to limit 
access to the chief executive and delegate duties and tasks to staffers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
thus allowing the president to focus on broad issues and 
responsibilities.^^ Because the chief of staff delegates 
responsibilities, his duties also include keeping staffers focused on 
the president's goals and making sure the president's agenda is being 
followed. Since the chief of staff inevitably comes into a vast amount 
of contact with staffers, he addresses minor problems that surface 
inside the White House. For example, if a dispute arises, the chief of 
staff will mediate between staffers and make a decision. While the 
chief of staff is of secondary focus in this paper, the experiences of 
presidents who have not chosen to organize the White House 
hierarchically with a chief of staff demonstrate the necessity of 
utilizing such a powerful staff position.
Before assessing the Carter administration, the growing importance 
of the V/hite House staff shall be discussed in a historical overview of 
the development of the staff system. The overview traces how and why 
the White House staff grew, and how it was managed.
A general overview of Carter's management style will also be 
examined, followed by a case study of his legislative liaison's 
interaction with Congress regarding the administration's energy 
proposal. An analysis of Carter's management technique sheds light on 
how his style affected his relationship with Congress eind, ultimately, 
the passage of the energy package. The energy package is important in 
this study because he thought it would define the success of his term. 
Before examining the case study, a clear description of the modern 
functions of the Office of Congressional Relations (OCR) should be 
explained. Carter's relationship and management of the OCR is the focus
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the case study in regard to the energy proposals examined in Chapter 
Four.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The president did not have a staff office like the Office of 
Congressional Relations at the beginning of the Republic because the 
founders frowned upon too much executive intrusion into the 
legislature's business. Therefore, there was no staff organization, and 
the president accomplished his tasks with little help. As the 
government grew, however, so did the need for staff to free the 
president from less important tasks. Problems in the modem world have 
become increasingly complicated, and the solutions to such problems have 
also become complex. For example, the Great Depression resulted in 
people expecting the government to manage the economy in order to avoid 
another economic crisis.^ As a result, many staff offices now take on a 
greater role than just accomplishing such tasks as sorting the mail or 
typing a note for the president. As the president has become a prime 
initiator in proposing legislation, staffers presently help the 
president formulate proposals and lobby for passage of legislation.
This chapter examines the importance of staff and major trends in 
staff development, which will offer a glimpse into the importance of 
staff in the modem presidency. The different way presidents manage 
their staffs also provides insight into the difficulties they face in 
staff organization.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Origins of the Executive Staff
The concept of an inner body of advisors derives from America's 
British heritage. King Henry II believed that he needed a council of 
trusted and faithful advisors chosen by himself to further the 
monarchy's programs. In the same vein, the founders of the Republic 
left to the chief executive the option of organizing an advisory body, 
rather than creating a separate advisory body for him. Some framers 
thought that such a body would be necessary to insulate the president 
from possible damaging problems. Others believed such insulation of the 
president problematic because he could then do as the King of Englsmd 
did: unjustly, and irresponsibly, blame his staff for bad advice.^
They thought that the president of the United States should be 
responsible for his decisions and not be protected by a coterie of 
advisors.
Many of the founders wanted the executive to remain a singular
institution because, without several unelected staffers in the White
House, the presidential office would represent unified leadership.^
Alexander Hamilton opined in Federalist Paper Seventy that, in the
Executive Branch:
No favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the 
disadvantages of dissension in the executive department.
[The sinful character of several human beings working in the 
White House] serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of 
plan or measure which they relate, from the first step to 
the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract 
those qualities in the executive which are the most 
necessary ingredients in its composition— vigor and 
expedition.
Hamilton's admonition was a reaction to the presumed negative effects of 
staff and an advisory system in relation to human ambition:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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One of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the 
executive...is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy 
responsibility...It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual 
accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the 
punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of 
pernicious measures, ought to fall...The circumstances which 
may have led to a national miscarriage or misfortune are 
sometimes so complicated that where there are a number of 
actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of 
agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there 
has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to 
pronounce to whose account the evil which may have incurred 
is truly chargeable.
Needless to say, Hamilton did not support a vastly staffed Executive.
He feared that, just like the King, the president could blame council
for his own bad decisions. The president could also claim that council
divisions precluded better resolution on certain issues.^ Therefore,
the Constitution omitted formal recognition of staff.
The Constitution did allow, however, for written opinions from
subordinates which would allow one to pinpoint responsibility for
8governmental decisions. While not many expected that department heads 
would become the president's principal advisors, in 1791 President 
George Washington encouraged his vice-president and department 
secretaries (State, War, Treasury, and the Attorney General) to consult 
each other on issues. Eventually, Washington met with these men to 
discuss problems of the day and to develop political strategy. James 
Monroe referred to this group as the "president's cabinet" whose 
responsibility was to counsel, as well as support, the chief executive.^ 
Despite this input from the vice-president cind department 
secretaries, Washington and the second United States President, John 
Adams, complained about the workload facing their administrations. In 
1789 Congress allocated money for assistance to the president.^® The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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legislators increased the president's salary to cover expenses for 
hiring a personal secretary aind a few clerks.
To relieve his workload, Washington also utilized Tobias Lear, his
11personal secretary, as a liaison between the White House and Congress. 
Lear's role was especially important because Congress' disparate makeup 
made it difficult to affect legislation. As Washington noted;
The impossibility that one man should be able to perform all 
the great business of the state [was] the reason for 
instituting the great departments, and appointing officers 
therein, to assist the supreme magistrate in discharging the 
duties of his trust.
Still, the duties of the executive office increased and surpassed 
the work hours available from the cabinet and advisors. Secretary of 
State John Quincy Adams noted that when he worked for President James 
Monroe, he frequently received documents eighteen months after Monroe 
obtained them. Adams concluded that the demands on, and workload of, 
the president caused chronic delays and backlogging of the government's 
business beyond what the cabinet could keep up with.^^ Nevertheless, 
for the next one-hundred and forty years, the cabinet remained the 
president's principal advisory group and staff support system. Among 
its many duties, the cabinet assisted the president by lobbying for 
certain measures originating on Capitol Hill.
In the nineteenth century, the White House had very little to do 
with the legislative process because Congress created and proposed all 
bills. When the president disagreed with certain proposals, legislative 
leaders were usually powerful enough to stop the White House from 
effecting any kind of c h ange,E ve n though the president was 
interested in certain pieces of legislation, overall, legislative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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actions were not a matter of intense concern for the chief executive
because he had more burdens emanating from non-legislative 
15correspondence.
Nineteenth-century presidents continued to utilize personal aides
and servants, as well as department secretaries, to assist in the
political duties of the executive office. The salaries of these
executive staffers came out of the president's own p o c k e t . I n  1825
James Monroe became the first president to lodge formally a complaint
with Congress that he did not have a sufficient staff or fiscal
resources to cope with the demands of the o f f i c e . T h o u g h  they did not
act immediately on this complaint. Congress eventually decided to
increase the appropriation for more staff. But it was Adams who began
the trend that led the presidency away from sole reliance on the cabinet
towards the creation of a formal White House staff whose exclusive
responsibility and loyalty laid with the president. Unlike secretaries,
staffers would not have to report to Congress and lobby the legislature
for appropriations. They would only have to report to the president who
hired and fired them.
Andrew Jackson adopted Adams's staffing ideas and became the first
chief executive to move away from the use of the cabinet in favor of a
18"coterie" of personal advisors. Jackson noticed that his
secretaries were beholden to their own interests which were generated by
dealing with their department personnel. They lacked what he thought
were "the necessary standards of selflessness and candor" needed in a 
19staffer. Jackson believed that only a candid personal staff/advisor 
could relate which goals were realistically attainable. He also thought 
that staffers should carry out the president's wishes faithfully. While
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the organization of Jackson's White House staff and advisors went 
unduplicated in subsequent administrations, the need for more immediate 
administrative help was addressed in the following administrations.
In 1857, Congress authorized a salary of $2,500 a year for a 
private secretary; $1,200 a year for a steward to take charge of the 
White House domestic establishment; and $900 for a part-time messenger. 
By the time Abraham Lincoln was elected president, the personal 
secretary evolved into an invaluable position for the chief executive. 
The secretary began to take on "chief of staff" responsibilities; 
directing subordinates and managing access to the president.
Abrsihcun Lincoln's Precedent Setting Personal Secretary
The election of President Lincoln prompted one his most famous
unscripted speeches. As he boarded the railroad for Washington D.C.,
several Illinois friends shook his hand and congratulated him as he made
his way to the train and began to speak:
My friends— no one not in my situation can appreciate my 
feeling of sadness at this parting. To this place, and the 
kindness of these people, I owe everything. Here I have 
lived for a quarter of a century, and have passed from a 
young to an old man. Here my children have been bom. and 
one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when, or whether 
ever, I may return, with a task before me greater than that 
which rested on Washington. Without the assistance of that 
Divine Being...I cannot succeed. With [His] assistance I 
cannot fail. Trusting in Him, who can go with me, and 
remain with you and be everywhere for good, let us 
confidently hope that all will be well. To His care 
commending you, as I hope in your progress you will commend 
me, I bid you an affectionate farewell.
As the train pulled away a breathless reporter rushed up to the 
president and asked him if he could have a copy of the speech "before
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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his noble words were lost forever.'' Lincoln then made a feeble 
attempt to write dovm the spontaneous speech when his personal 
secretary, John George Nicolay, seized the writing utensil from him and 
finished the task. Author Michael Medved states that: "it seemed
entirely appropriate [that] one of Lincoln's most celebrated public 
utterances should come down to us through [an] intermediary"— a 
staffer. Medved believes this action becomes more understandable only 
when taking into account the duties staffers are responsible for in the 
modem political age. Nicolay performed at that time what has become 
the normal operating procedure for staffers in the modem age— writing 
and transcribing the president's speeches.
Nicolay left quite an imprint on the presidential office because of 
his unprecedented, wide, and varied duties. With the Civil War 
underway, he guarded access to Lincoln so the President could 
concentrate on the war. Nicolay made Congressmen who previously had 
unlimited access to the Oval Office wait. This angered several
24legislators because no "staffer" had ever had such power before.
Nicolay also read, answered, and summarized the president's mail. His
duties further included reading and summarizing newspapers, and writing
opinion pieces for the New York Tribune. While Nicolay had wide and
varied duties, his responsibilities did not include relations with
Congress. However, his precedent-setting responsibilities paved the way
for further increases in executive responsibilities.
Teddy Roosevelt became the first president to present legislation
to Congress. This action was controversial because only the leaders of
each chamber decided the legislative agenda and presented such
25legislation to Congress. Roosevelt also used his office and limited
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staff to lobby the Hill on proposals being considered in Congress.
Though Roosevelt did not propose these measures, he publicly took credit
for initiatives such as the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.
Roosevelt's actions increased the public expectations of the executive
office and opened the door for future presidents to generate legislation
and present it to Congress.
President Woodrow Wilson continued the trend set by Roosevelt.
Just before taking office he wrote that a chief executive "must be the
prime minister, as much concerned with the guidance of legislation as
with the just and orderly execution of law, and he is the spokesman of
27the Nation in everything.' '
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Brownlow Report
Prior to FDR's administration, no formal White House staff offices 
existed. If the president's own personal secretary could not assume 
some of the burdens of the office, employees were borrowed from the 
departments. However, this practice eventually subsided. The use of 
cabinet members as advisors lost its appeal steadily throughout the 
1800s-1900s because many presidents wanted a staff more dependent on, 
and solely answerable to, them. In turn, the White House staff gained 
prominence atnd became the primary advisory amd lobbying entity for the 
president. The increased importance of staff resulted in centralizing 
the executive's operations.
FDR's legacy forever changed what the populace expected the federal 
government could and should do. Many scholars note that FDR marked the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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beginning of the modem presidency because of the dramatic expansion of
23supporting offices, agencies, and staff of the executive office.
With the advent of the Great Depression, FDR found that he needed
29more help than the existing staff could provide. The public expected 
the president to relieve the country of the effects of the poor economy. 
The impact of the Great Depression rendered theories of limited 
government obsolete.^® The economic collapse forced the president to 
take a more proactive role in legislation facing the House and Senate. 
The president's new role meant he would need more staff to lobby 
Congress.
Since the citizenry looked to the president, not Congress, for
leadership during the poor economic times, the chief executive set the
domestic legislative agenda. In this way, FDR changed the nature of the
office to an activist presidential office. But the aggressive rate at
which he wanted to create new organizations and restructure the
31governmental bureaucracy disturbed even avid "New Dealers," To
assuage the perception that his plan to reorganize the executive was
drastic, FDR attempted to coordinate newly created agencies with old
ones by forming the ''Emergency Council" in 1934 to streamline the 
32administration. However, the meetings were huge and created 
confusion. Instead of allaying fears about FDR's activism, controversy 
increased.
In 1937 FDR commissioned the "President's Committee on 
Administrative Management'' to research ways the president could be 
h e l p e d . Public-administration scholar Louis Brownlow chaired the 
committee and affirmed in his findings that the president needed help. 
Brownlow wrote that the president's "staff was inadequate to fulfill
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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[his n e e d s ] . T h e  Brownlow Committee recommended hiring four
presidential aides including: a special counsel, an executive clerk,
appointments secretary, and a press secretary. These staffers were to
35be "possessed of high competence and have a passion for anonymity.
The report stated that:
These aides would have no power to make decisions or issue 
instructions in their own right. They would not be 
interposed between the president and the heads of his 
departments. They would remain in the background, issue no 
orders, make no decisions, [and] emit no public 
statements.
Brownlow wrote that he and FDR were very close in thought on "how
to establish a simple but effective machinery which [would] enable [the
president] to exercise managerial control appropriate to the burden of
37responsibility imposed upon him by the Constitution." The Brownlow
committee report intended to create an executive branch that could meet
the needs of the "developing administrative state." However, FDR
went beyond what Brownlow intended, using the report to reorganize the
whole White House bureaucratic structure. The Republican opposition
denounced the legislation as a "dictator bill," because the increase
of executive employees appeared to be a maneuver by the President to
39increase his powers over the other branches. But FDR's plans for 
reorganization had public support: the citizenry wanted the federal
government, and especially the president, to do something. Congress 
thus approved the Brownlow committee report.
Two years following the enactment of Brownlow, Congress and FDR 
passed the Reorganization Act of 1939.*® This measure gave the 
president additional authority to submit plans for the reorganization of 
the executive branch— subject to congressional veto. The Act also
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created the "executive office of the president" and expanded FDR's 
role as the chief manager of the White H o u s e . T h e  Act of 1939 thus 
further centralized control in the Oval Office and increased the number 
of people reporting directly to the president. By Roosevelt's third term 
Vftiite House advisors assumed many of the roles previously the sole 
domain of the departments.
Despite some Republican opposition to Roosevelt's ambitious
restructuring programs, the President was able to organize his VJliite
House without much opposition from the majority of Congress. As Garry
Wills contends, Roosevelt was able to get much of what he wanted
precisely because he became responsive to the public's wishes for a more
proactive p r e s i d e n t . H e  understood the new expectations on the
government and grasped the public's desire that he articulate their
wishes to Capitol Hill. Wills states that: "Roosevelt ministered to a
sick nation. Economic cures were being proposed on all sides, and
43Roosevelt was ready to try any of them." Wills's statement captures 
the main reason behind the increased responsibilities and staff size of 
the executive branch. More staffers were needed to help the 
administration communicate with legislators on complicated pieces of 
legislation.
To increase his chances of getting his initiatives passed through 
Congress, the president employed White House liaisons to keep the lines 
of communication open between the White House and C o n g r e s s . T h e  
liaisons kept him aware of congressional activities that might help or 
hurt the administration by reporting to him what congressional members 
were saying and doing on the Hill.
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In light of these new executive responsibilities, FDR changed the 
function of government. By the time Dwight Eisenhower was elected, the 
White House staff was a fixture of the executive.
The Eisenhower Administration
President Eisenhower had a clear idea of how he wanted to improve 
White House operations. Pundits of the time described Eisenhower as 
having a "strong sense of order and a readiness to delegate.
Drawing on his vast military experience, Eisenhower believed the tfhite 
House staff would function smoothly if a military concept of order and 
organization was instituted. Eisenhower thought that "organization 
cannot make a genius out of an incompetent; even less can it, of itself, 
make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. On 
the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in 
inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster. Eisenhower
instituting a chief of staff system where one man would carry the 
responsibility of supervising all other a i d e s . T h i s  attempt to create 
a more efficient executive office was not the sole reason for 
Eisenhower's legislative success.
Eisenhower made sure that his staff appointments were experienced 
Washington insiders. He asserted that by hiring those who knew how 
Washington worked his administration would be more successful in 
lobbying congressional members. President Eisenhower was the first to 
appoint an experienced full-time congressional liaison to the newly 
created Office of Congressional Relations (OCR). He argued that having 
an appointment who could relate to legislators would link the White 
House and Congress in a congenial relationship. The OCR thus began to
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field immediately requests from legislators on appointments and
patronage. Eisenhower's actions sent the legislators a message that he
wanted to work with the legislature. Had he opted for an appointment
unknown to the members on the Hill, the bargaining relationship with
Congress would have been complicated. The liaison's experience meant
the administration would spend little time learning how to affect
48legislation and work with individual legislators.
Eisenhower initially believed in limited government and v;anted to 
return the White House staff to its pre-World War Two size. He thought 
that he could get by with just a personal secretary, a chief of staff, 
and a few general assistants. But almost immediately upon taking office 
he faced more of a workload than he expected and reversed his plans to 
decrease staff size. With the rise in stature of the VThite House staff, 
the cabinet continued its decline in influencing the president. Since a 
large staff system increased the chances of mistakes. Eisenhower 
announced all decisions in front of the department heads and head 
staffers to ensure that both the staff and the departments knew what was 
expected of them and what goals the administration would pursue. He had 
his Chief of Staff follow up on these decisions to remind the cabinet of 
the positions taken by the president. The staff also reminded the 
department heads to implement the president's decisions. In this way, 
Eisenhower assured that everyone in the administration, including the 
OCR, focused on the same goals.
Eisenhower's system allowed cabinet officers to run their daily 
operations without much presidential interference. He wanted the 
departments and staff offices to take care of most of the problems while 
he concentrated on larger issues. When cabinet members and staffers
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disagreed among themselves, they were to see the Chief of Staff, Sherman
Adams. Adams mediated differences, and his decisions were final.
Adams's presence and powerful position in the White House provoked many
4*̂in the administration to nickname him "the governor." ' Eisenhower
saw his Chief of Staff as his "son of a bitch" since it was Adams's
job to guarantee that the administration ran smoothly.^® Those who
served directly under Adams noted his imperious style. One staffer,
Robert Gray, recalled that during some meetings with Adams he was
51"afraid to inhale for fear of breathing fire. " Sherman also chaired 
all staff meetings where he would lecture those in attendance about the 
most minute details concerning the direction of the administration.
None challenged his orders because the relationship he had with the 
president was clearly beyond question. The staff system under 
Eisenhower removed many of the President's burdens thus allowing him to 
concentrate on larger issues like his proposals.
Lyndon Johnson and the Growth of the OCR
The most efficient and successful use of the OCR came from
President Lyndon Johnson's organizational style. He had the OCR gather
information on many legislators, not just on their voting records, but
also on their politics and the political pressures on them from their
districts and states. The OCR reported directly to LBJ. He also made
sure that the liaison office kept him current on any activity and all
legislation making its way through the Congress. One OCR staffer,
Claude Desautels, stated that;
Lyndon Johnson was a kind of generator of interest, and he was 
thorough in his knowledge of legislation, and so interested in 
even the smallest piece of legislation. As long as it was on that
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'must' [priority] list, he wanted you to go out and win it. He'd 
go over the list with you and say, 'Well what are we doing about 
this? Where are we here, and where are we there? VThat are we 
doing?' As a consequence, you'd sometimes get 60, 70, 80. bills 
on that list and he knew exactly where they were...knew them all, 
and he'd follow them.
Johnson kept up with the bills pending on the Hill by installing direct 
phone lines between the Oval Office and the OCR. By pressing a button 
on the phone with a liaison's name on it, Johnson could reach the 
staffer and inquire about a piece of legislation that the liaison 
followed. The OCR, however, went beyond mere lobbying on Capitol Hill 
and informing the President on the status of bills.
Johnson made sure that the OCR rewarded legislators who backed his 
proposals. He reasoned that those compensated for their support would 
be more likely to vote for White House initiatives in the future. The 
OCR also made sure to reward the administration's most ardent and loyal 
supporters so as to not give them the impression that Johnson took their 
support for granted. The compensations took a variety of forms. For 
example, one loyal Johnson supporter and member of the House Public 
Works Committee, Fats Everett (D-TN), wanted a warden employed by the 
Fish and Wildlife service removed, but the Department of the Interior 
was intransigent. Henry Wilson of the OCR took up Everett's problem and 
wrote to Oren Beatty, the Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior.
The warden was then fired. Everett appreciated the administration's 
work and expressed his willingness to assist the President when he 
wanted a bill passed.
Legislators also received government programs and projects for 
their state. Representative Carl D. Perkins (D-KY), who supported the 
Great Society programs and most specifically the Economic Opportunity
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Bill, received sixteen million dollars worth of projects for his 
district— six million dollars above the quota provisionally allotted to 
him. 5"*
However, if legislators could not support the VJhite House, the 
President did not indiscriminately punish them. The OCR took into 
account the politics of the congressperson's district on difficult 
votes. If the voters of a particular district did not like a piece of 
legislation, Johnson could not realistically expect a Congress member to 
vote with the administration. Generally, though, the OCR knew which 
votes would be difficult and tried to include those members whose votes 
were needed to make the bill more attractive in the negotiating process.
The Nixon Administration; Questioning Presidential and Staff Power
As vice-president. Richard Nixon had become impressed with
Eisenhower's staff system. He recruited two former Eisenhower aides,
Bryce Harlow and Andrew Goodpaster, to help him put his staff together.
He asked Harlow to help because of his success in the Congressional
Liaison's Office. The decision to bring Harlow to Washington
illustrates Nixon's belief in the importance of White House
organization. It also demonstrated that Nixon was a management
conscious president who was concerned about the way the White House
functioned. The President-elect and his Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman,
began to focus on White House structure and procedures weeks prior to 
55the election. Haldeman spent many hours preparing for his job by 
reading books about staff management. Additionally, just after the
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election, the President-elect flew to Florida with a few staffers to
relax and prepare for taking office.
Initially, Nixon did not think he would concentrate as much power
in the Chief of Staff as he eventually did. Nixon believed that Adams
had too much power in the Eisenhower administration. He wanted to be
more accessible to his top staffers. But Nixon soon scrapped this
organizational plan, realizing that his time was valuable and he needed
someone to guard the Oval Office door and limit access to him.
Haldeman also made sure Nixon's decisions were carried out. He
explained that every administration has to have a clear cut
organizational structure so as to move constantly the administration
toward its goals. He insisted on a "zero defects" operation where
57everything the President wanted would be carried out flawlessly. In 
this way he was very much like Sherman Adams, who eventually made 
enemies within the staff structure. Haldeman created animosities 
because of this zealotry. With his German name and crew cut hair style, 
some inside the White House labeled him "the Nazi."^® Haldeman 
rationalized these descriptions of him: ' 'Every President needs a son-
of-a-bitch, and I'm Nixon's. I'm his buffer, and I'm his bastard. I
CQget done what he wants done and I take the heat instead of him.'' 
Clearly, Nixon knew how he wanted to get things accomplished. But he 
became too detached from the legislative process and he took a combative 
approach to Congress. Furthermore, he relied too heavily on Haldeman 
without supervising what his staff chief was accomplishing in his name.
Nixon thought that Washington had three demons that must be 
confronted: the press. Congress, and the federal bureaucracy.^® His
most intense opposition was directed at the legislature. Instead of
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using his liaison staff to bargain with Congress, he unprecedently
impounded funds the Hill appropriated to programs he did not like. He
thus tried to use administrative actions instead of engaging in the
legislative process. For example, in the Fall of 1972 Nixon vetoed the
Water Pollution Control Act that provided eleven billion in
appropriations in 1973 and 1974 for building water pollution plants.
Congress overrode his veto. But Nixon was so intent on stopping this
62legislation he impounded the funds appropriated anyway. Since this
approach offended many members of Congress, it rendered his use of the
OCR generally ineffective.
In 1969 Nixon sent to the Hill the Family Assistance Plan (FAP)
which was a welfare reform package guaranteeing families in America a
minimum income. The plan emphasized workfare over welfare and had broad
bi-partisan support. The President announced that FAP was his "high
domestic priority," but his administration's lack of enthusiasm in
lobbying for its passage made many question whether he really supported 
63the initiative. For two months after the details reached Congress, 
the White House, and the OCR, fell silent on the issue, and Congress 
responded coolly to the plan. When it became evident that the plan 
would not even make it out of the House Ways and Means Committee, Nixon 
began to lobby the House membership intensely. He even temporarily 
organized a liaison team whose sole job was to promote FAP. The 
administration's efforts paid off, and on March 5. 1970, the House 
approved the FAP proposal. However, after this victory, the 
administration ran into more problems in the Senate.
Both liberal and conservative Senators found something wrong with 
FAP, but the Nixon administration once again fell silent on the proposal
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because they believed that the House vote signaled smooth sailing for 
the Senate’s consideration of the plan. However, because Nixon and his 
staff did not communicate with Congress, the White House was not aware 
of the problems many legislators had with FAP. The department head of 
the Urban Affairs Council. Daniel Moynihan. stated that the 
administration "was not sufficiently aware of the danger...the 
altogether different mood of the Senate Committee [from Ways and Means] 
was not sensed."
Two days after the Senate Finance Committee began hearings, members 
of the committee voted against the bill, surprising the administration. 
Though staffers and department heads immediately began working on a 
compromise proposal, Nixon's continued reticence over the initiative did 
not send legislators the message that the President really wanted to 
pass the bill. Even the OCR was left out of the planning process. Five 
weeks after the Senate Finance Committee killed FAP, Nixon decided to 
reenter the debate. He personally called Senators and invited them to 
the White House for dinners.
However, these personal appeals did not have much effect on the 
Senate. On October 8, 1970, the Senate Finance Committee voted FAP down 
fourteen to one. All six Republicans voted against the bill. Many 
summed up their perception of Nixon and FAP: "He wanted the bill, most
of the time, taut not that much."^^ Senator Albert Gore stated that he 
did "not have the faintest indication as to the President's lobbying 
efforts to get the Family Assistance Plan through Congress in 1970."^"^ 
The difficulties of achieving FAP prompted Nixon to restructure the 
executive office.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
In response to the administration's organizational problems Nixon
became dissatisfied M±th the powerful Chief of Staff system. To make
sure his subordinates kept their eye on the administration's goals,
Nixon created a "counter-bureaucracy" within the White House to keep
track of those he h i r e d . N i x o n  concluded that the vast bureaucracy,
specifically in the departments, kept him from getting things
accomplished. Presidential aide John Ehrlichman echoed this sentiment
when he said that "we only see them [department secretaries and
employees] at the annual White House Christmas party; they go off and
marry the natives. In other words, those who worked for the
departments did not pursue the interests of the administration, but
rather those outside the administration.
The drawback of the counter bureaucracy was that Nixon created an
entity that competed for the loyalty of the President.^® Some believe
that the creation of this extra staff body precipitated the Watergate
71scandal. The White House staff grew to more than 4000 employees.
After the 1972 election, Nixon realized the error of creating a vast
executive staff. He announced that he had lost confidence in his
appointees. He believed that the White House staff must decrease in
size so he could more formally control them. Nixon may have displayed
such urgency over staff size to deflect growing concern over Watergate.
But some have concluded that the scandal began, initially, by those
around Nixon; a large and uncontrollable counterbureucracy had gone off 
7?on its own.
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Conclusion: The Consequences of Expanding Staff
The consequence of the Nixon administration's problems with 
Watergate provoked more intense studies on White House structure and 
organization. Nixon's experience, and the possible detrimental 
implications for the country, compels one to consider seriously how a 
staff should be organized to help the president with the legislation he 
wants passed.
By the end of President Johnson's administration, the number of
73policies emanating from the White House increased dramatically.
Congress and the public expected a broader legislative domestic agenda 
from the president. Johnson reinforced these expectations by convincing 
the public that government could relieve such problems as poverty. As a 
result, greater demands were made on the White House for policy 
coordination. Johnson's remedy for the poor was encapsulated in his 
Great Society initiatives. Without a liaison staff bargaining with 
legislators on his behalf, Johnson would have found himself overwhelmed. 
Johnson thus continued what FDR started in 1934: the use of staff to
meet rising expectations from the public that more must be accomplished 
on the executive level. Still, Eisenhower articulated some possible 
drawbacks of the staff system.
Even though Eisenhower revolutionized the way presidents organized 
staff, the staff has potentially become a way for presidents to avoid 
accountability. For example, Eisenhower Press Secretary James Hagerty 
noted that the President created a buffer zone between himself and the 
public and press. As Hagerty stated, "he would say 'do it this way' 
and I would say 'if I go to that press conference and say what you want
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7 4me to say, I would get hell.'' Eisenhower replied "better you than
me. In this way, Hamilton's admonition in Federalist Paper Seventy
regarding the staff providing political cover from criticism has been
ignored. Still, many hold the president responsible for any problems
with the White House staff because he is the person who organizes and
manages his subordinates.
Vîhile FDR was pivotal in creating this opportunity for presidential
expansion and control over the White House staff, Eisenhower set the
standard of managing those who would fill the expanding executive
positions. While the Brownlow Committee intended to limit the powers
and responsibilities of staffers, presidents have found this aim
unreasonable because it makes it difficult for the President to meet all 
76his demands. Some scholars have suggested that the Brownlow
committee's recommendations have proven to be a double-edged sword for
the president. On the one hand, a large scale staff is difficult to
control, weakening the presidency and the ability of chief executives
to effect change. On the other hand, the growth allows the president to
concentrate on more important things while enlisting support for
77legislative programs. Both assertions have merit. FDR and Eisenhower 
used their staff systems to their advantage with minor negative 
repercussions. However, as the Nixon example demonstrates, some chief 
executives are not as adroit in managing their staff.
Many of Nixon's problems, regardless of his hostility towards 
Congress, emanated from his detachment from the legislative process. 
Nixon remained distant from his OCR staff, and they had little input 
into the policy process (as evidenced in the FAP p r o p o s a l ) . T o  make 
matters worse. Congress did not take the OCR seriously because they
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perceived the liaisons as not being able to speak on behalf of the
-?gPresident. This perception was reinforced as Nixon did not
communicate with them on a regular basis. Further, there is no evidence
that Nixon had Haldeman relay important instructions to the OCR staff.
Indeed, he rarely saw most of his personal staff ad vi so rs .N ix o n' s
unwillingness to communicate with his subordinates fostered an
environment which lacked discipline and cohesion. The Vfhite House thus
81looked disorganized.
The counter bureaucracy he established in the attempt to take 
control of the Vrtiite House did not provide the control he was looking
Q Ofor. " Ironically, despite Nixon's desire for isolation, he was very 
concerned with the details of things other than the management of his 
administration. For example, he wanted to choose the White House 
furniture himself, and he wanted extensive memos on v;hat wines were 
offered and served at White House functions. In this sense, Nixon 
spent too much time on unimportant details of the White House when he 
should have been managing and articulating his goals to his staff.
Though President Carter did not organize his White House in the same way 
as Nixon, they had similar organizational styles. Like Nixon, Carter 
did not seek to organize and communicate with his staff. Carter also 
had a penchant for details. These similarities spawned similar problems 
for the Carter presidency.
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CHAPTER 3 
CARTER AND HIS STATF
The election of Jimmy Carter surprised many due to his political
anonymity.^ This relative obscurity lead many to rule him out as a
contender early in the campaign. However, the disastrous effects of
Watergate prompted the country to want change. In response to the
public's negative reaction to the Watergate scandal. Carter sought to
distance himself from the Nixon legacy. He campaigned as an outsider
and promised to curb the excesses of Nixon's "imperial" presidency.^
Since Watergate focused public attention on the potential power of staff
to do illegal things on behalf of the president. Carter instituted a
more decentralized and inclusive White House staff system. He promised
that there would be "no all powerful palace guards in my White House,
no anonymous aides, unelected, unknown to the public, and unconfirmed by
3the Senate, wielding vast power from the White House basement."
According to Carter's Press Secretary. Jody Powell: "the
Watergate scandal had a significant impact on the type of structure 
Carter chose to implement in his White House... there was a sense of 
concern about having an excessively powerful White House staff in 
general and a Chief of Staff in particular."^ He wanted to avoid the 
powerful Chief of Staff system that existed under Haldeman because he 
believed that it would cripple the effectiveness and success of his 
administration by increasing the chances that staff would become 
involved in illegal activities. To allay such fears, and to increase 
his own success. Carter eliminated the chief of staff position. The
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President believed he could conduct both his presidential duties and 
those of the chief of staff.
Carter reasoned that without a staff chief, more information would 
flow into the Oval Office resulting in a president better informed about 
the activities within the VThite House. The chief executive, therefore, 
could stop anything antithetical to the administration's goals. The 
President thought that without powerful figures like Sherman Adams and 
H.R. Haldeman, covert activities would cease.
Believing that a powerful White House staff would choke off the 
flow of information to the President, Carter insisted that all option or 
opinion papers, except for highly sensitive security issues, should 
"make the loop" so all advisors could review the material before a 
decision was made. To keep up with the massive amount of paper flow 
into the Oval Office, Carter and some staffers enrolled in a speed 
reading course.
While the advisors and staffers were impressed with Carter's
command and knowledge of the issues— especially his attention to
detail— many thought that this system consumed too much time. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Assistant for National Security Affairs, concluded that the
amount of time Carter spent reading stemmed from information overload.
As a result. Brzezinski made an attempt to prevent his office from
forwarding too much to the Oval Office:
At first I would send him a great deal with a cover memo
saying 'please look at the introduction, look at the 
conclusion, look at the clipped pages. Here is my analysis.
Here are the other points of view. You have some options.'
And the whole thing would come back to me annotated from
beginning to end. He would read the whole thing. And so 
after awhile I realized if I sent him something, he was 
going to read it.
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Brzezinski found that 300 pages a day reached Carter from the National 
Security office. In response, Brzezinski actively sought to limit the 
amount of material heading to the Oval Office.^ Despite Brzezinski's 
forethought, the president still received an extensive amount of reading 
material.
Ominous Beginnings; Carter's Commitment to Decentralization
Some members of the president-elect's administration were concerned 
about Carter's organizational intentions. Joseph Califano. an 
experienced politician and Carter's Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, noted that "the new president evinced little sense of what 
Washington was like or of the complexities of governing."^ Califano's 
statement foreshadowed an event that occurred soon after the election. 
After the inaugural ceremonies, the President's immediate staff met in 
the Roosevelt Room in the White House to organize and set priorities. 
They were jubilant, but soon became uneasy as no one knew what to do or 
who might take charge. Eventually Frank Moore, who would become the 
Assistant Congressional Liaison, turned to Carter's personal advisor, 
Hamilton Jordan, smd said ''Ham, what do we do now? Moore's question
Ogot no answer.''
Before the election Moore talked with several presidential experts 
and past advisors and developed a transition and organizational plan. 
However, Jordan blocked the plan, thinking it unnecessary. Instead of 
spending time formulating a staff hierarchy. Carter announced that he 
would institute a "Cabinet Governments" No White House staff would
9dominate or act superior to the department secretaries. The
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secretaries were granted mere authority on policy issues. Jordan 
asserted that many past presidents were confronted with unnecessary 
problems when relying too heavily on staff. He reasoned that staffers 
could not accomplish everything from the White House. Carter argued 
that it made perfect sense to spread responsibility to as many as 
possible so no one organizational structure would become overburdened.
Still, while Carter wanted to utilize the departments more than his 
predecessors, he also wanted to make all the decisions from the Oval 
Office. Carter insisted on being immediately available to almost all 
significant personnel in his administration, including department heads 
and a few staffers inside the White House.
Despite the staff's access. Carter wanted the cabinet to be the
focal point in helping develop policy eind implement the administration's
programs without the assistance of the executive staff. To accomplish
this, he spent more time in meetings with his secretaries than with the
11vrhite House staff. Initially, he communicated with the staff through
memoranda. The Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy, Stuart
Eizenstat, became frustrated with this style:
Frequently, though not always, I would suggest that if there 
was a particular important...or divisive issue, those 
memoranda [should] be followed up by meetings with the 
principals in which I would participate. But more often 
than not, the president liked to make decisions from paper 
and I would get back...his handwritten comments.
The organization Carter instituted looked like a "spokes of the 
wheel" system where he represented the hub of the wheel and several 
subordinates, representing the spokes of the wheel, would have direct 
access to the hub (see appendix A). As a result, he spent a good deal
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of time settling issues that could have been taken care of at a lower 
level.
According to Brzezinski, Carter did not like to delegate "non-
14presidential stuff." Hans Mark, Secretary of the Air Force, suggests
that the President's military background was the central reason for his
attention to such detail: Carter served on a nuclear submarine, where
all must have an acute attention to detail. Stuart Eizenstat, the
Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy, said: "he wasn't satisfied
making a decision unless he felt he really knew the facts about it. In
that respect, I think he demanded more material than other presidents 
15might.'' Some, like the Assistant for the Public Liaison, Ann Wexler, 
defended Carter's style: "If you're really going to make decisions,
and when the buck really stops at your desk, you better...know what the 
intricacies of that decision really are. And he did."^^
White House Structure; Consequences of Carter's Management Style
Since Carter put almost all of his energy into knowing the minute
details of his policies and inner workings of the V/hite House, he did
not focus on the big picture and he did not articulate the most
important goals of the administration. In other words. Carter did not
convey the broad goals of his administration. He did not consider it
part of his job to relay his overall vision to the rest of the 
1 7administration. The "spokes system" promoted an organization 
without a sense of priorities. Consequently, his staffers could not 
pursue a definite agenda on behalf of the administration because there 
were several proposals being considered on one topic. The White House
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Staff did not knov; how to function in their positions because they
lacked direction. A case in point concerned the Domestic Policy Staff.
Staffers spent most of their time trying to discern what the President
w a n t e d . I n  frustration, the staff amassed a list called "promises,
promises" which listed all of Carter's campaign promises so the staff
19could work toward some of the goals he stated to the public. The list
did not serve the administration well because several staffers ended up
working on different promises at the same time. The staff, not
organized to work toward just a few goals, failed to accomplish much
because they could not decipher which issues were most important. The
decreased significance of the vniite House staff further complicated the
administration's problems by granting the Cabinet more control over
policy formation and advocation.
Carter believed that the Cabinet should take on duties formerly
belonging to the White House staff in the area of creating and lobbying
for proposals. President Carter's new organizational system, however,
led not only to poor coordination, poor implementation, and bickering
between the departments and the White House staff, but also to
disloyalty on the part of several key cabinet officials.^® He allowed
the secretaries to appoint their own subordinates and thought that the
department secretaries should create and build their own management 
21teams.
Cabinet members were elated by this decision, but staffers objected 
because they thought it infringed on their duties of overseeing and 
coordinating the administration. Departments naturally compartmentalize 
into closely guarded areas of authority, and each cabinet office wants 
to have sole domain over a specific area like commerce or labor. No
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other department or staff office is allowed entry into another without 
expressed permission.^ However, departmental proposals often affect 
more than one narrow area. Part of the staff's job includes resolution 
of conflicts emerging from departmental turf struggles. Giving the 
cabinet secretaries more authority fostered a mistrust between the staff 
and cabinet. In allowing the departments to set their own policy 
priorities without White House interference, the President gave up a 
significant amount of policy making authority.
Departments were permitted policy development leeway without VThite 
House knowledge or coordination over proposals. Vfhile Carter spent so 
much time working through the details of V/hite House initiatives, 
departments formulated and proposed their own measures. Thus, the
24administration ended up advancing several conflicting policy programs. 
During the Spring of 1978, the Cabinet continued to make announcements 
contrary to White House policy. For example, the Secretary of 
Agriculture announced a bigger increase in price supports for grain than 
the White House determined necessary. In another incident, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Ted Blumenthal, denied the possibility of tax 
reform at the same time that the White House planned a reform package.
He also publicly contradicted the policy statements of the presidential 
economic advisors. The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
criticized Carter's monetary policy and decided to draw up plans for 
programs that far surpassed the President's more conservative budget.
Since the White House did not actively partake in, or direct, 
policy formation, the secretaries could not resolve conflicts when they 
arose. The problem emanated from the fact that no one cabinet agency 
fit neatly into one policy area. For example, a president cannot direct
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 4
one department to solve the trade deficit problem because that agency
would cross many jurisdictional lines: Labor, Transportation, Defense,
25Treasury, Energy, and the CIA. Carter could not take the time to 
solve conflicts that surfaced between departments because he did not 
have time. Thus, he could not make sure the secretaries forwarded 
initiatives that agreed with VJhite House proposals. Some scholars argue 
that as a result of Carter's limited time, the department heads took 
liberty to act as if their organizations were "personal fiefdoms."^^ 
They forged ahead with their personal proposals without any regard for 
what other departments might be planning or advancing.
Hamilton Jordan commented that the departments ''were independent
of one another and thus oblivious to the political relationships of
27their programs." He noted in a memo to Carter that "we have a major
problem in the coordination of goals and objectives of your
28administration." All departments considered themselves equal in
importance and would not yield to the other; they jockeyed for position
over turf rather than working together. Policies written to accommodate
29both sides were incomprehensible. However, even if they did work
together, they had "no clear sense of where the president was leading"
the administration.^® The lack of direction from the administration
provoked several concerned memos addressed to the President. For
example, Hamilton Jordan wrote:
We should develop a system for identifying goals and 
objectives of this administration. We should translate 
those goals and objectives into specific tasks and assign 
each task to a responsible person with a work plan and a 
timetable. Finally, we should develop a system for 
monitoring progress and problems. We should also develop a 
system for scheduling the major activities of the President 
and Vice-President that reconciles their limited time with 
the priority activities of the Administration.
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A.D. Frazier, a staffer on the Chief Executive Reorganization Project, 
wrote that the VJhite House staff needed either a chief of staff or some 
kind of staff coordinator, Frazier thought that a coordinator could
provide the President with a plan for dealing with issues in a timely 
manner and ensure implementation of those decisions. But Carter made it 
clear that his administration did not need either position.
Two months after the Frazier memo, eleven months after the
inauguration, Eizenstat wrote Carter expressing his concern about the
lack of coordination:
There is no mechanism by which, on a regular basis, we can 
find what the other is doing that may have impact on an area 
in which we are working...no one has been given the 
directive to sift out the various priorities of our work, to 
coordinate our work and make sure it is all going in the 
same direction, before it all pours in to you.
Soon after the Eizenstat memo, the White House staff tried to convince 
the President that government business had become too complex to leave 
in the disparate hands of the departments. Jack Watson, the Assistant 
for Cabinet and Intergovernmental Affairs, originally supported Carter's 
commitment to cabinet government. However, he eventually criticized the 
"spokes of the wheel" structure because the administration lacked 
c o h e s i o n . W a t s o n  began to advocate a more hierarchical staff system 
to rein in the unruly department secretaries.
The most vocal department head was Health, Education, and Welfare 
Secretary Joseph Califano. He decided to offer a plan banning smoking 
in all public places, but he forwarded this proposal to Congress without 
discussing it with the White House. Califano reasoned that Carter would 
approve of the announcement because the President stated during the
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campaign that he wanted to develop preventive health care policies. 
However, Carter did not know Califano proposed the ban until the 
congressional delegation from North Carolina— representing the nation's 
largest tobacco industry— notified him of the proposal.
In response to the continual coordination problems between the 
White House and the cabinet, in 1978 Carter limited the power of the 
departments by requiring all domestic proposals to go through Eizenstat 
for approval. Additionally, all international proposals were to be 
filtered through Zbigniew Brzezinski. Hamilton Jordan also began to 
monitor the departments. Some secretaries responded by becoming even 
more vocal and rebellious. Califano publicly criticized the White House 
for being behind the curve on everything. He also opposed the creation 
of the Department of Education; Blumenthal continued to differ with the 
Viîhite House on tax policies. Echoing Califano's complaint, Blumenthal 
said the he v;as ''sick and tired of seeing the president and 
administration two and three and four months behind the curve on 
everything. He added that Carter's "presidency [was] looking so
foolish, being dragged hind tail by events."
Generally, the cabinet believed that the problems with the 
administration were the result of the White House staff who leaked 
negative information to the press. They also blamed the staff for
OOseldomly returning departmental calls. The problems between the 
cabinet and staff originated from the organizational structure set up by 
Carter. Part of these problems were allayed when Carter gave the 
Domestic Policy Staff more control under Stuart Eizenstat.
When Carter granted them more authority and appointed Stu Eizenstat 
as the Assistant for Domestic Policy, they became increasingly
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organized. Eizenstat immediately disbanded the Domestic Council, formed 
the Domestic Policy Staff Office, and hired twenty-five experienced 
professional Washington insiders who had the ability to influence 
Congress. They advised Eizenstat on proposals under development in the 
departments.
The Domestic Policy Staff also established policy objectives and 
then invited relevant agencies and departments to submit memoranda which 
would then be summarized in short memos to Carter. These memos 
contained yes/no boxes for Carter to check so he could relate which 
ideas he supported. The inclusion of the policy staff improved 
communication and increased the administration's cohesion. However, 
while they had more authority. Carter insisted on keeping them on a 
short leash— not granting them the authority necessary to do their job. 
The staff still did not have power to coordinate domestic policy over 
the cabinet.
The inability of the Domestic Policy Staff to work to its fullest
capacity inhibited them from settling many disputes among agencies,
39departments, and staffers. Eizenstat did have some success in 
mediating a conflict between the Energy Department and the Treasury 
Department. The Energy Department wanted a twenty percent tax credit 
instituted for those citizens who installed solar energy equipment to 
help heat their homes. Conversely, the Treasury Department wanted to 
limit the same tax credit to ten percent. Seemingly at an impasse, 
Eizenstadt forced a compromise by splitting the difference to a fifteen 
percent credit.^® In reality, however, the secretaries still retained 
much of their influence over their departments and the proposals that 
emanated from them.
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Several scholars have taken a second look at the Carter 
administration's insistence on pursuing a cabinet government. They
conclude that he was naive about the effects of the 
decentralized/spokes-of-the-v/heel organizational structure. For 
instance, when Carter called cabinet meetings, he would ask his 
secretaries about several different issues and expect all of them to be 
as informed as he was on the issues in question. Instead, the 
departments wanted to focus on area effecting their oim interests. If 
an issue crossed departmental lines, as frequently occurred, all 
agencies in question wanted to have a say in the policy. Without a 
centralized staff to enforce decisions, the departments continued to 
pursue their own agendas. Frustrated by the difficulty of getting his 
executive house in order. Carter's weekly cabinet meetings became 
informational rather than decision-making sessions.
Carter's initial vision of cabinet government lasted only six 
months. Jordan slowly restricted access to the President, and Eizenstat 
increased the prominence of the executive staff. Major policy 
initiatives, like energy and welfare reform, were filtered through the 
"Georgia Mafia"— those Georgians whom Carter appointed as VJhite House 
advisors upon taking office. After discussing the issues with his 
staffers. Carter would retreat to the oval office, alone, to make a 
decision. Some suggest that this isolation guaranteed failure*. "He 
did not work 'with those who have spent their careers coming to know 
what can be done' or 'what the people will accept. ' Consequently,
when he and his advisors did meet, they rarely disagreed with him since 
Carter discouraged forcing problems into the open for debate.
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Carter was an extremely intelligent President, possibly the most
intelligent one in the modern era. His acumen prompted him to expect
others to know the issues thoroughly before speaking. This attitude
intimidated staffers and quelled honest and open discussions about the
issues. One White House aide recalled a time when Carter asked all
those in a meeting what the administration should do concerning an
issue. Vrhen this aide began speaking. Carter interrupted him and
45ridiculed his opinion. Thus, Carter lacked the capability to force 
disagreements out into the open.
Even though several staffers and advisors in the White House wanted 
to discuss the mistakes they believed their President made, they did not 
speak up for fear of losing their position and Carter's respect. The 
advisors rarely disagreed in meetings or in other open atmospheres. 
Carter promoted this fear whether he knew it or not, and thus deprived 
himself of valuable information.^^ Carter once berated Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance for disagreeing with the President's foreign policy 
objectives. An angry Carter "lit into Vance" and accused him of 
leaking embarrassing information about the administration to the 
p r e s s . C a r t e r  further told Vance that "if this goes on, I will make 
my decisions only with Fritz [Mondale] and Zbig [Brzezinski] and simply 
not tell anybody else.''^^ VAien Vance continued to oppose the 
President's Iranian foreign policy, he was excluded from the rescue 
mission of the Americaui hostages.
Despite Carter's warning, Vance opposed the rescue mission because
49he believed it was "poorly conceived" and "difficult to execute." 
When Vance decided to take his long planned vacation in Florida. Carter 
called a meeting of his top foreign policy advisors who favored the
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rescue attempt. A stunned Vance became angry that the administration 
made such a monumental decision in his absence. Inevitably, Vance 
resigned because he believed that he had no latitude to do his job 
properly.
The White House Staff Begins to Speak Up
Since the atmosphere within the White House appeared hostile to
dissent, advisors and staffers failed to discuss difficult questions.
Carter's beliefs remained unchallenged, and he was unaware of his policy
problems. No rigorous evaluation of policy existed— especially in the
first year of the presidency. Jordan echoed his concern at lack of
White House debate in a memo he wrote to Carter:
I have been concerned that you and all of us talk too much 
to one another and don't have the benefit of different 
points of view that challenge some of the basic premises on 
which our decisions are made. I think the real challenge is 
to assemble a small group of people that you trust and are
comfortable with and have collective experience to provide
you with advice on...issues.
Jordan suggested a more open dialogue and a request to centralize the
executive by giving the staff more authority. Despite Jordan's urging,
*51some suggest that Carter had faith only in himself and not the staff.
But a collegial, or spokes-of-the-wheel, system that promotes a 
decentralized system, requires input from all offices and departments 
invited to the decision-making table.
Furthermore, collegial systems cannot organize policy analysis or 
encourage policy development without direction from the Oval Office. In 
many ways, the collegial system demands more time from the president 
because of the many staffers and aides who have direct access to him.
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Because Carter was "dov/n in the weeds...[and] did not have a global 
view of what he wanted" the White House personnel were beleaguered on 
two different levels. They could not argue against Carter substantively 
on the issues because his knowledge created the atmosphere that any 
staffer or cabinet member who spoke up looked ignorant. " Additionally, 
both the staff and the cabinet did not know specifically how they should 
go about achieving all that Carter wanted.
This organizational and implementation dilemma serves as an example
of the complexity and controversy within the Wliite House. Paul C.
Light, a presidential scholar, believes that the decision making process
eventually spanned many offices and departments, and thus decisions took
53several weeks to complete. The problem with having so many people 
involved in the decision process is that what may begin as a bold and 
clear initiative in the beginning becomes unrecognizable and hard to 
understand in the end, frustrating and alienating the staff.
The Assistant for Cabinet and Intergovernmental Affairs, Jack
Watson, echoed these problems encountered in the early part of the
administration;
In 1977, when we came in, there were simply too many 
initiatives of too high a level of controversy and 
complexity that he wanted to do all at once. Let's pass a 
national urban policy. Let's pass a national comprehensive 
national energy policy. Let's reorganize the executive 
brainch of government, and so on. . .Those were things 
involving huge political^^apital expenditures, and we did 
too many things at once.
Frank Moore, the Assistant Congressional Liaison, wrote to the 
President; "The consequence of Cabinet Government is that the 
administration's programs lack coherence...too often departments pursue 
their own interests even if those interests conflict with stated
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5 5administration goals." One White House aide expanded on Moore's
statement by pinpointing the problem emanated in Carter's original
cabinet structure:
All of our problems are aggravated by the so called 'cabinet 
government' efforts...But you cam't run the government that way 
from 10 department locations. It is just too difficult to get 
government together. There are so many agencies involved in one 
issue. People don't understand that five agencies all going in 
different directions create chaos. There needed to be a 
coordinating place. There had to be a legislative package 
prepared by the administration...It took us most of the year to
figure this out and to begin to iron it out.
James Fallows, Carter's chief speechwriter, echoed the aide's comment.
He thought the administration wasted the first year in office while
groping for answers and that an administrative coordinator would have
helped. Without a coordinator. Fallows reasoned that there was no way
of knowing how all the policies generated would relate to one another
57once presented to Congress and in what priority.
This disorganized approach to staff direction in general affected
the legislative agenda of the administration. The president determines
58how the office runs, and how it is organized and operates. The
question that constantly arises within the White House ''is how to
organize the executive office to ensure presidential priorities are 
59carried out." Carter's rejection of hierarchy made it difficult to 
coordinate and enforce his goals. The inflow of briefing and reading 
material from various secretaries and staffers further took away from 
the President's time to coordinate or set priorities.
Carter tried to do more than many presidents, but with a less 
orderly hierarchical organization. Because he wanted to know everything 
generated from the administration right down to the finest detail, he
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did not delegate responsibility. The spokes of the wheel system served 
to bog dô vn the decision making process. The system overwhelmed the
President and thus took away from the effectiveness at setting a clear
. 60 agenda.
The breakdown in the way Carter managed his VJhite House became most 
evident in his relationship with the Office of Congressional Relations. 
The problems with the White House organization would have detrimental 
effects on not only his relationship with the OCR, but also his 
relationship with Congress. These difficulties would have a detrimental 
effect on his energy bill. Before understanding the problems that 
Carter faced concerning the OCR, one needs to have knowledge of the 
formal structure and duties of the OCR.
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Chapter 4
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ENERGY PROPOSAL 
Though its duties and responsibilities are wide and varied, the OCR
provides a necessary link between the White House and Capitol Hill.
Once the functions of the office are known, then a glimpse into how 
Carter did or did not effectively manage may be understood. Though the 
institution is a modem creation in the Executive Branch, much of the 
traditional functions of the office were formed during the 1950s.
Organization and Duties of the Office of Congressional Relations
President Dwight Eisenhower created the OCR, also called the 
Legislative Affairs Office, to facilitate relations with Congress.
While subsequent presidents have organized the office differently, the 
OCR has four main objectives: {1} lobbying, (2) intelligence gathering,
(3) representation, and (4) interdepartmental organization.^ To make 
sure these are being carried out requires the constant attention of the 
OCR head. The central function of the liaison office lays with lobbying 
Congress to pass the president's initiatives. In a mutually supporting 
way, when liaisons lobby the Hill, they communicate with legislators and 
inevitably discover their concerns. Thus, intelligence gathering 
involves the liaison to gather information on the status of the 
president's initiatives. It also includes the liaisons to keep track of 
what congressional members are thinking. Representation combines what 
is learned in the prior objectives and the OCR relays information from 
the Hill to the president and vice-versa. In this sense the OCR
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communicates both the legislator's concerns and White House concerns. 
Finally, the office should be organized in such a way that the liaisons 
knows what their duties are and what committee assignments must be 
attended on the Hill. However, the objectives involve more than just 
accomplishing these general responsibilities.
Under the lobbying category, the OCR should know which pieces of 
legislation the White House considers most important in order for the 
liaisons to prioritize the initiatives for Congress. Once the 
legislature knows what legislation the President deems most important, 
they can confront each program in relation to what the Ifhite House 
considers most important. Lobbying also includes responding to 
congressional requests for favors, thus fostering a better negotiating 
climate for consideration of the president's initiatives. For example, 
some members of Congress might ask the president to appoint one of their 
political supporters to an executive post. The OCR fields these 
requests and maintains communication between the legislator and the 
chief executive while the appointment process is underway. This kind of 
communication with Capitol Hill also contributes to the OCR's 
intelligence gathering responsibility.
Many requests come to the VThite House via the mail. The 
Legislative Affairs Office acknowledges receipt of the mail. The 
letters are also catalogued for the president. Finally, with the 
president's direction, the OCR prepares a response stating the 
president's position. The OCR receives and answers mail coming from 
Capitol Hill addressed to most executive offices. It answers the mail 
in coordination with the department or staff office to which the letter 
was directed.
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In conjunction with gathering information through the mail, the OCR 
also conducts head counts for the president on measures, and assesses 
the probability of passage of these measures coming up for a vote. The 
head counts assist the OCR in deciphering what developments on Capitol 
Hill might disturb the president's agenda. For example, when a 
representative's constituency does not like the president's programs, 
the legislator will most likely not support the White House proposal.
As long as the OCR maintains contact with the Hill, the Vfhite House will 
be able to find out what legislators will and will not vote for. This 
information enables the chief executive to bargain with congressional 
members and thus produce a bill that the majority of both houses will 
accept.
Representation brings together both lobbying and information 
gathering responsibilities. The OCR must not only relate the 
president's wishes to Congress, but also express congressional views to 
the chief executive. It is only through this relationship that both 
branches may engage in a bargaining relationship. To represent the 
president and congress member effectively requires interdepartmental 
organization.
Interdepartmental organization requires the OCR to oversee 
individual liaison members to make sure they are performing their 
duties: properly representing the president, attending committee
meetings, relaying all the information certain legislators are feeling. 
The fulfillment of these responsibilities requires liaisons to spend 
much of their time on the Hill.
The OCR is usually divided into Senate and House groups. Within 
each group, individual staffers are assigned to specific committees
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where they follow the president's initiatives and communicate with
legislators. This organization helps the office track certain proposals
emanating from the White House. Staffers find themselves rotated
between committees so as not to wear out their welcome with one
congressman. Former presidential aide Richard Patterson explains that
the rotation of liaisons occur so the politician does not: "look up
2and exclaim 'Oh, it's you again!'" This rotation keep a legislator 
from becoming annoyed at a particular persistant liaison. Once a 
congressional member becomes wearied by a certain staffer, that 
liaison's effectiveness in lobbying and gatherming information declines. 
If the OCR has its liaison team effectively organized, rotating liaisons 
also demonstrates the administration's competence.
The advancement of the president's agenda is the first priority of 
the OCR.3 Beginning at 7:00 in the morning the liaisons report for 
several rounds of staff meetings. Afterward they head to Capitol Hill 
to lobby congressional members and sit in on committee hearings. Other 
staffers back at the White House many attend cabinet meetings or other 
executive sessions. Their presence is especially valuable for the 
administration because they will likely know what proposals will and 
will not get through Congress. Since the liaisons have more contact 
with Capitol Hill than most staffers, they know what politicians will 
accept and what initiatives will face opposition.
The OCR does not have an office on the Hill, but the individual 
staffers usually use the vice-president's Senate office as a 
coordinating center while the House group utilizes the various rooms 
delegated to congressional leaders as office space.^ There are also 
several places inside the Capitol building that are restricted. The
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House and Senate floors, as well as the cloakrooms, are off limits to 
liaisons as well as lobbyists. However, the space granted to the White 
House staffers by Capitol Hill serves as needed coordinating centers 
especially when crucial measures come up on the legislative agenda.
The liaisons conduct head counts on these crucial votes "since the 
presidential party leaders don't know the opposition's head count and 
the opposition leaders won't share it."^ These numbers of those who 
support the executive are relayed back to the president so he can make 
any last minute calls to shore up votes. If the staff identifies an 
undecided member, the liaison tries to get past the politician's staff 
and talk to him/her directly.
One Republican White House staffer describes the last-minute 
lobbying just before the members go in to vote on legislation;
I would station myself by the door which the Democrats used.
There might be ten to fifteen people lined up on each side 
of the entryway— mostly union lobbyists. The congressman 
might have a last question before going in, or I could 
remind the member that I had come to his or her office 
beforehand. Maybe I could convince them to hold their votes 
until the very end. At the very least, my standing there 
was a signal to them that I was watching the members, that I 
cared enough to stand out there and be there. I would go 
around later and say a personal thank you for a vote, or 
remind them that they had promised me but had backed down.
If they had not shown up, I could ask, "Where were you?"
But standing in that throng was an intimidating experience 
[for the legislator]....
This statement demonstrates the positive influence the OCR liaison team 
may have in lobbying legislators to vote for the President's proposals 
if not in the short teirm, the long term. The OCR's presence at least 
lets members of Congress know that the White House is concerned about 
its legislative program.
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As both houses conclude their business for the day, the liaison's 
job does not end. The Congressional Relations Office is located in the 
East Wing of the VThite House. It is here that the lobbyists prepare 
briefings and bios of members coming to see the president in the near 
future, writing up one-pagers for the presidential phone calls, or 
inquiring in the agencies about the status of an issue or project.^
The OCR must also demonstrate to Capitol Hill that their message 
receives the full support of the chief executive. To help the OCR 
accomplish its responsibilities, the staff needs to confirm that they 
speak on behalf of the president. For instance, Eisenhower would direct 
one of his staffers. General Parsons, to bring congressional members to 
the Oval Office. These meetings with the President bolstered Parsons's 
credibility on Capitol Hill because Eisenhower would repeat and confirm 
the messages Parsons relayed to Congress. After these meetings the 
legislator would go back to the Hill and say; "I talked with the
Qpresident." This process confirmed to the legislators that when 
Parsons spoke with them, he did so with the President's full support.
In essence, bringing the congressional member to the Oval Office 
confirmed Parson's believability to many on the Hill.
To make sure the tactic used by Eisenhower works effectively, the 
congressional liaison head must have access to the president so he can 
tell a Senator or Representative that he has spoken with the president 
about the issue. This communication may occur in face-to-face meetings 
and/or through memoranda. For example, Frank Moore, the head of the OCR 
under Carter, would compile a legislative report for President Carter 
who would in turn mark up the report and send it back to Moore with the
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following comments: "'Make it clear I will veto'; 'Don't push it'; or
Q'Move on him, I can help.'"
In a similar way, before Reagan called on a congressional member,
10his staff would prepare "talking points" enclosed in a folder.
While speaking, Reagan would scratch notes in the margin's of the memo: 
"Send the Senator more information;" Follow up on point 3."^^ These 
instructions were sent to the legislative liaison's office where the 
staffers would act on the president's instructions. In these ways the
congressional liaisons for both Reagan and Carter found it much easier
12to advance the president's legislative programs.
Communication between the chief liaison and the president fosters 
coherency in White House legislative planning. The president instructs 
the OCR when to compromise and when to stand firm on issues. The 
staffer will also know specifically when to pressure the congressional 
member who might want favors from the Vïhite House. For example, a 
staffer might pressure a legislator to extract a vote favorable for the 
president: "If you can't help the president on this vote, that's going
to make it awfully hard for the president to help you on that 
appointment" for your friend or political s u p p o r t e r . O n c e  the 
president has let the OCR know what should be accomplished and how, the 
bargaining process functions more smoothly. Ultimately lobbying 
Congress resembles a two-way street between the president and his 
staffers and members of Congress— communication decreases 
misunderstandings between the two branches.
The ability to bargain with congressional members is an arduous 
process. One of President Kennedy's staffers. Larry O'Brien, noted what
was entailed in the bargaining with Congress:
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It becomes a way of life in which you are engaged in human 
relations and constantly working out compromises. You 
listen to and solicit support from everybody on the Hill. 
You cajole, urge and plead. There's always the hot breath 
of opposition; don't resent it, understand it. You have to 
appreciate that at times there are those, even among your 
friends, who can't go along with you, that there is a line 
that they can't cross. Just remember, there is always 
tomorrow.
One can see in O'Brien's statement the frustrating nature of trying to
get others to agrees with the Mhite house. One Reagan Vniite House aide
commented that inevitable disagreements do not necessarily damage the
future bargaining atmosphere:
We may never agree on an issue, but legislative affairs 
people always discuss, even with their opponents, why the 
disagreement is there, get their views, and they realize 
that while they don't agree on a given question they may 
agree on the next issue coming up.
The examples portrayed by O'Brien and the Reagan White House illustrate 
how the OCR fulfills its responsibilities with the president's guidance. 
With direction, the White House moves one step closer to realizing its 
goals,
The OCR was developed as a tool for the White House to build 
congressional coalitions for its programs. Given the growing 
independence of the members of the legislature and the increased White 
House participation in initiating legislation, the OCR provides the 
necessary bridge between the two branches. Seen in this light, the OCR 
requires White House coordination so that the staff office knows how to 
best serve the president in his efforts to pass his agenda. Above all, 
the president must inform the OCR on which legislation the White House 
deems most important and instruct them to lobby Congress accordingly. 
Yet this complicated process concerning the organization of the White
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House and management of the OCR is a recent phenomenon. Still, the 
grovTth of the government demonstrates the necessity of staffers in order 
to help the president accomplish his job. Yet lobbying Congress became 
more difficult after 1973.
Like the Carter administration. Congress reacted to the effects of 
Watergate. VJhile Congress has always tended to mistrust presidential
17leadership, the Watergate scandal exacerbated their suspicion. After
Nixon's resignation, a whole new class of independent minded politicians
took their seats in Congress. Though many of the newcomers were
Democrats, they raised their own money, ran their o%vn campaigns, and
thus had little loyalty to the Democratic P a r t y . P a r t  of Carter's
problem with Capitol Hill over his legislative proposals originated from
19this increased assertiveness of congressional members.
The more independent legislators are, the less deferential they are 
to presidential leadership. The autonomous legislator tends to become 
more attentive to constituency needs and demands. One Nixon 
administration aide remarked that "Congress certainly isn't going to 
be...sympathetic" to the president's agenda because they have their own 
constituents to think about and their own political agendas which differ 
from the president's g o a l s . A s  a result, the ability of the chief 
executive to build legislative coalitions becomes more difficult because 
congressional members are more responsive to their constituents than to 
him. The new political class heightened legislative difficulties and 
tensions between legislators and the President. This reality only 
enhanced the importance of maintaining good relations. But Carter did 
not appreciate the importance of the legislative branch in general.
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Thus, his problems with Congress did not solely originate from Watergate 
and congressional mistrust.
As Governor of Georgia, Carter developed a negative impression of
the state's legislators. During one presidential campaign stop on a
farm in South Dakota, a reporter asked whether the cows reminded him of
Georgia's legislators. Carter replied, "No, they're [the cows] more 
21intelligent." He appeared to hold much of this same disdain for the 
» ,
United States Congress. He believed that Congress could not assist in
formulating his programs because doing so would violate the public 
22trust. He saw the presidential office as above the influences of
special interests that plagued congressional politics. The President
thus frequently attempted to bypass Congress by appealing directly to
the public for support. Nevertheless, while the people elect the
president. Congress is the only body that can pass the chief executive's
initiatives into law. The executive must communicate with, and respect,
the legislative branch in order to build coalitions. In meiny respects
getting a bill through Congress is difficult. As President John F.
Kennedy explained:
It is very easy to defeat a bill in the Congress. It is 
much more difficult to pass one. To go through a 
subcommittee... and get a majority vote, the full committee 
and get a majority vote, go to the Rules committee and get a 
rule, go to the floor of the House and get a majority, start 
all over again in the Senate, subcommittee and full 
committee, and in the Senate there is unlimited debate, so 
you can never bring a matter to a vote if there is enough 
determination on the part of the opponents, even if they are 
a minority, to go through the Senate with the bill. And 
then unanimously get a conference between the House and 
Senate to adjust the bill, or if one member objects, to have 
it go back through the Rules Committee, back through 
Congress, and have this done on a controversial piece of 
legislation where powerful groups are opposing it, that is 
an extremely difficult task.
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24Congress must be courted into partnership. The president, along 
with the Office of Congressional Relations, provides the means for 
overcoming the divisions that exist between the executive and 
legislative branches. Working with legislators entails a "social 
exchange" between the chief executive and members of C o n g r e s s . B o t h  
institutions request support for the various programs advanced by each 
branch. Former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, observed the 
essential nature of this exchange in an interview with Bill Moyers :
Clifford: ...if a president fulfills his obligation, then he must 
have a program. And if he has a program, then he must try 
to get the Congress to pass the program. And in doing 
that, there occurs one of the most skillful areas...So 
you've got a program. You want to get it through. You 
have an energy program. You have a civil rights program. 
You have a human rights programs. A president has to have 
a program. He absolutely flounders if he doesn't know 
politics.
Moyers ; Which is trading, which is compromise....which is 
persuading.
Clifford: Sure. Which is saying, 'I have certain things that you
want. But you have certain things that I want. And I 
will work out arrangements with you in which you will get 
some of what you want if you will give me some of what I 
want. ' And it goes very nicely. And what you do, too, 
is you invite congressmen to the White House for 
dinner., .And after a while you can call [the congressman] 
in. And [the president] says, 'Does that law partner of 
yours still want to be a federal judge?' 'Oh,' he says, 
'he certainly does.' 'Well,' he says, 'you know I've 
been thinking about that lately and we're going to talk 
cibout that. But in the process of talking about that, I 
want to talk with you about the fact that I think we've 
got to increase our Social Security program.' 'Well. Mr. 
President. I've spoken against that.' 'Well, I know Joe. 
But times have changed. And you think about it awhile, 
you see. Let a week go by, you call me.' Joe calls him 
in a week and says, 'Mr. President I've been thinking 
about that and I think there's a lot of merit to your 
position. And I believe I can change on the Social 
Security. I want to come over and talk to you. And, 
incidentally. I talked to my partner, and he is just 
tickled to death.' Now people say. 'Well, that's 
politics.' That's the way the country runs. That's the
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way business runs... That's the way our government runs.
[It] is that you're constantly trading back and forth to 
get your program.
The president cannot be the sole player in the exchange process 
with Capitol Hill. With 535 members of Congress, the chief executive 
cannot possibly deal with all the representatives. Therefore, the 
Office of Congressional Relations assists the president in communicating 
with Congress.
Carter and his Relationship with the OCR
President Carter had a very distcint relationship with his Office of
Congressional Relations. Carter was an introvert and tended to withdraw
27from most people in the administration. Because he tended to isolate
himself from staff members, he did not communicate with them
extensively. Barbara Kellerman states that a president's lobbying team
is a reflection of the man: If a president is withdrawn, so too will
2Shis staff become withdrawn. It is difficult for a liaison team to 
lobby for programs, though, if the staffers are withdrawn from the very 
people they need to lobby.
Since Carter was an introvert, he not only refused to play the 
political game, but also failed to make sure others played the game for 
him and bargained on behalf of him. The lack of communication between 
the President and his liaisons became evident soon after the election.
Once elected, a president's staff receives a flood of requests from 
Congress to have their political supporters appointed to governmental 
positions. The nomination of congressional supporters warms the 
negotiating atmosphere between Capitol Hill and the White House by
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fostering goodwill on the part of the Congress member. Fulfilling some 
of the representative's wishes opens the door for the administration to 
capitalize on the good relationship with legislators by asking, in the 
future, for support of legislative proposals. Capturing early support 
from the legislature requires the OCR to hit the ground running by being 
prepared to handle the influx of requests. The congressional liaison 
office must field the flood of calls and correspondence, and establish 
communication with Congress. But the OCR's head liaison, Frank Moore, 
without having much contact with the President, did not have a clear 
idea of what to expect after the election.
In the administration's first week of office, Moore received
hundreds of calls and over 1,100 letters.^® Moore found himself
immediately behind in the requests for favors and members of Congress.
These members of Congress frowned on Carter's lack of responsiveness to
these requests and thus viewed the incoming administration with
suspicion that it would be combative with the Hill. VJhen Moore failed
to return the calls and correspondences of several legislators, they
31believed Carter intended to treat the Congress hostilely. For 
example. Oversight Committee Chairman, Representative John E. Moss, who 
had a reputation as an outspoken foe of government corruption but who 
supported open government processes, tried to call several staff offices 
and did not receive any return calls. Moss hoped the staff just got 
behind the avalanche of requests. But after a lengthy period of time 
without a return call, he believed Carter's staff was employing 
stonewalling tactics like Nixon employed in order to thwart the 
legislature's will.^Z During the Nixon administration, chief of staff 
H.R. Haldeman came under fire for erecting a "Berlin Wall" around the
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33president. In a similar way Carter's distant relationship with the 
OCR fostered ill will between the OCR and Congress because the Hill saw 
the President as erecting another "Berlin Wall." Because of Carter's 
continued reticence, his staff did not know how to consult and bargain 
with congressional members. This negative perception of the OCR on 
Capitol Hill eventually spilled over to affect their opinion of other 
White House staffers.
Carter was in office for only one week when House Speaker Thomas
"Tip" O'Neill complained that the White House failed to consult
34adequately with Congress. The problems with the Speaker began when 
the White House staff denied O'Neill inaugural tickets with favorable 
seating customarily provided for congressional leaders. The 
administration fueled the controversy by replying publicly that O'Neill 
received his tickets but wanted more. Hamilton Jordan stated that if 
O'Neill did not like his tickets he should exchange them for a refund. 
Insulted, the Speaker began referring to Carter's assistant as 
"Hannibal Jerkin. O'Neill responded: "if you're going to do
petty little things like this you have no respect for me as a Speaker or
as an individual... the problem with the people around Carter is that 
they spend so much of their time running against Washington they don't 
know they are now part of Washington. Tony Lake, a staffer in the
State Department under Cyrus Vance, explained the administration's 
error; "Washington hates it when presidents don't treat it with the 
respect it believes it deserves.
In addition to the negative perceptions of staff. Carter personally
angered the Speaker. In their first meeting. Carter did not give the 
impression that he would work with the legislature. For example, the
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President stated that, when pressed, he would go over the heads of 
legislators and appeal to the public directly instead of cutting a deal 
with congressional leaders. The Speaker replied that if he followed 
through on his threat, it would only further alienate legislators.^® 
Carter also angered O'Neill by appointing two Republicans from 
Massachusetts. He named Eliot Richardson as Ambassador-at-Large, and 
Edith J, Dobelle as Chief of Protocol at the State Department.®^
O'Neill responded that "as a Democrat. I'm upset that the first two 
appointments from Massachusetts are Republicans."^® The Speaker 
quipped, "we won the election, but you'd never know it.
Carter’s unwillingness to communicate with the OCR, combined with 
his attitude towards Congress, created a tenuous atmosphere which made 
make it more difficult for the VThite House to get legislation passed by 
Congress. Many of the problems Carter and his liaison team experienced 
with the Hill upon taking office surfaced with the presentation of his 
energy initiative.
Carter and the Energy Bill
VJhen Carter entered office in 1977, the nation was faced with an 
energy crisis. The United States could not meet the domestic demand for 
oil on its own. To meet the need for oil, the United States had to 
import one-third of its oil from the Arab countries. In 1973 the nation 
imported six million gallons of oil— roughly half of all the oil the 
citizenry consumed.*^® By 1974, the energy needs deepened resulting from 
the Arab oil embargo and the formation of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). After his election. Carter stated that he
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would have an energy plan ready to present to Congress within ninety 
days of the inauguration to deal with the crisis.
The President asked James Schlesinger, a Republican economist and
former Nixon and Ford cabinet member, to work on a comprehensive energy
program. Schlesinger balked at the limited amount of time allowed to
put together a program, but, as one aide commented, the President
thought that people worked better when operating against a tight
deadline.However, Schlesinger lamented that he could not develop a
detailed plan and get Congress and other interest groups on board to
support the plan within the ninety days. Nevertheless, Carter
maintained the deadline. After making the initial public announcement,
however, he removed the issue from public debate by falling almost
silent on its development. His discussions about the bill were limited
to vague references and sketchy details. Not only did his staff not
know what the proposal included, but he also refused to include
45legislators in the policy formation of the bill. Carter reasoned that
the secrecy would decrease the amount of time to put together a proposal
by avoiding an "inside the beltway" uproar that would inevitably come
46when the administration released the plan.
On February 2, 1977, Carter went on national television and asked 
the American people to conserve energy. On February 22, he told a 
bipartisan group of congressional leaders that he had almost completed 
the outline of the energy program and would reveal the contents in a 
major speech to Congress in mid-April. While he said that he needed 
congressional help in passing the bill, he refused to let them know what 
they might vote on. After the meeting, several members of Congress 
criticized the President publicly for keeping the plan secret. Even
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White House staffers were kept in the dark about the plan. Carter 
ordered Schlesinger to "refrain from contact with other parts of the 
government— both Capitol Hill and the executive branch. One staffer
lamented that only Schlesinger and some White House staff knew what the 
plan looked like.^ Many legislators beseeched the President for 
inclusion in the policy process. A frustrated Robert Byrd, the Senate 
Majority Leader, asked Carter on April 5 whether he consulted any 
legislators in developing the energy bill. Offended, Byrd did not see 
the bill surviving the Senate. Still, the plan arrived on time to 
Congress.
On April 18, 1977, Carter went on national television to give an
"unpleasant talk" and present the plan to the public.^® He described
the energy situation as one that required public sacrifice; higher
prices and higher taxes were necessary to bring about an end to
unlimited energy consumption. He stated:
We do have a choice about how we will spend the next few 
years. Each American uses the energy equivalent of 60 
barrels of oil per person each year. Ours is the most 
wasteful nation on earth. We waste more energy than we 
import..,
I am sure each of you will find something you don't like 
about the specifics of our proposal. It will demand that we 
make sacrifices and changes in every life. To some degree 
it will be painful....It will lead to some higher costs, and 
to some greater inconvenience for everyone.
He said that the plan would test the character of the American people 
and that the difficult effort resembled the "moral equivalent of 
war. "52
On April 20 he addressed a joint session of Congress in an apparent 
attempt to underscore the seriousness of the crisis, but he did not 
speak as apocolyptically as he did on the 18th. Instead, he emphasized
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that the initiative would protect jobs and the environment. The
contrasting messages confused Congress in light of the television
address two nights earlier. Some questioned the administration's
53competence because of the switch in focus. Even thought the bill 
included tax credits for those who insulated their homes and provided 
incentives for development of alternative fuels to reduce domestic 
dependence on foreign oil, other legislators became concerned over the 
proposal's tax increases on natural gas, owners of older cars or gas 
guzzlers, and domestic oil.
Given its size, the bill traversed several congressional committee 
jurisdictions. Carter was surprised to leam that the energy proposal 
might be considered by as many as seventeen committees and sub­
committees in the House of Representatives alone.
Senator Byrd warned the President that the Senate would have to 
halt all other work to handle the energy package. Undaunted, Carter 
insisted that the Congress consider the entire proposal and added that 
he would not accept anything less. Vfhen one reporter queried, in 
response to Carter's intentions, that legislative success required a 
long cmd hard battle with Capitol Hill, Carter interrupted "it's one I 
don't intend to lose."^^
The President's resolve to propose the bill in its entirety did not 
bode well for the administration. His attitude solidified the 
perception inside the beltway that he did not intend to work with the 
legislators. By keeping the proposal secret he neglected congressional 
input. By not providing his own staff with information on the bill, the 
OCR could not gamer support to advance the legislation on the Hill. 
Aside from Schlesinger's continual lobbying efforts and testifying
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before various committees, few staffers worked on behalf of the 
proposal.Therefore, upon entering the House, the energy package did 
not have much support. Complicating the chances for success, the 
administration's lobbying efforts dwindled because Carter believed the 
Congress would act on the proposal favorably. Therefore, the energy 
package left the Oval Office without the White House to guide it through 
the legislature.
Speaker Tip O'Neill took it upon himself to assist Carter by
appointing an ad hoc committee to facilitate the administration's desire
for consideration of the energy package as one complete bill. At one
point Carter called O'Neill to ask whether he should go on television to
denounce some congressmen whose committees he believed gutted the
bill.̂ "̂  Carter was "perplexed and frustrated by the complexity of the
legislative process and the Democrats lack of loyalty to his 
58leadership." He believed that the House of Representatives wanted to 
compete, not cooperate, with the White House. The Speaker convinced the 
President, however, that the bill would turn out virtually identical to 
the one the administration proposed. O'Neill's leadership and skill at 
building coalitions kept the bill moving through the House with minor 
conflicts. At the Speaker's urging. Carter dispatched four lobbyists to 
the House. Carter even made personal phone calls, and wrote letters to 
House members to support the package. Four days later, on August 5, the 
House passed the proposal. Many credited the Speaker's guidance and 
leadership for its passage. But Carter did not leam from O'Neill's 
legislative persuasion when the bill moved to the Senate.
In the Senate, the administration reverted back to silence on the 
issue and did not appoint lobbyists to see the package through.
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Further, complicating the legislative process. Senator Russell Long (D- 
Louisiana), the powerful Finance Committee Chairman, opposed the tax 
increases in the bill. Even though Long, who represented one of the 
largest oil and gas producing states, feared that the energy package 
would harm his state's economy, the White House did not make an attmpt 
to cut a deal with him. He announced his plan to modify significantly 
the plan's increased taxation of industry. Even more disheartening for 
the administration, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources committees 
wanted to review the bill as well. The more committees that requested 
to review the bill, the more opposition the bill would likely face.
In October 1977, the situation worsened when Senate liberals 
invoked the first filibuster in thirteen years to stave off deregulation 
of gas prices proposed by Senator Long. But even though Vfhite House 
supporters of the initiative started the filibuster, the administration 
moved to quash the stalling tactic. Carter wanted to get the bill 
through Congress as quickly as possible. In a telephone conversation 
with Senator Dale Bumpers, the President struck a deal to let the 
liberals back out of the legislative maneuver gracefully.Since the 
filibuster was started by supporters of the administration's version, 
not to allow them to quit the filibuster on their own volition would be 
embarrassing. However, Senator Byrd and Vice-President Walter Hondale 
moved to kill the filibuster without warning the Senate liberals. 
Administration supporters believed that Carter betrayed them. Those who 
planned to end the debate as per Carter's agreement with Bumpers became 
angry at the President's double-cross to force an end to the filibuster 
without warning. For example, an enraged Senator James Abourezk from 
South Dakota called the president a "liar."^^ The New Republic wrote
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that Mondale's "dismantling of the filibuster conducted by allies of 
the administration...assured that nothing resembling a Carter energy 
bill [would]... emerge from [the Senate]. Even though Carter
addressed the nation again claiming that that the energy legislation did 
not represent a contest of strength between him and Congress, the 
filibuster debacle assured that nothing close to Carter's original 
proposal would come out of the Senate.
After the end of the filibuster in the Senate, Carter sensed the 
proposal's opposition mounting. To speed passage of the bill. Carter 
instructed his staff and cabinet secretaries to lobby for the bill. 
Carter also took a more active role in the lobbying effort in hopes of 
counteracting the damage caused by ending the filibuster.®^
On October 31, the Senate passed the initiative fifty-two to 
thirty-five. However, the Senate bill did not resemble the House 
version, much less Carter's original proposal. Further, the chances of 
getting a bill Carter could sign seemed minute because the House-Senate 
conference committee members were split on many points in the proposal. 
In response, the President canceled a trip overseas for fear that the 
compromise energy package would fail in his absence. Canceling the 
foreign visits three weeks before his scheduled departure embarrassed 
the administration because of the short notice, but the President wanted 
to make sure he would have a bill he could comfortably sign before the 
new year.
Carter again encouraged Schlesinger to lobby on behalf of the bill. 
In a November 21 press conference, the Energy Secretary stated that 
Carter might make significant concessions to get the comprehensive 
package through Congress. The Vfhite House tried to distance themselves
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from Schlesinger's comment. Jody Powell replied that "anyone who
believes the President will sign a bad bill is seriously mistaken...no
bill may be better than a bad bill. Carter added that he was in
"no mood to compromise." These contradictory statements reinforced
the conclusion that the President was isolated and did not communicate
with his staff. The conflicting statements projected an image of a
Vfhite House in disarray. Conceding that passage of the plan remote.
Carter left for his foreign tour on December 29, 1977. But the
President vowed to try again when he returned. Reflecting on this time
period. Carter wrote that the energy debacle "was one of my few major
disappointments of the year, but it was serious, because everyone
68realized the bills were our most important legislation."
Because of its impotence, the administration went to work again on 
the proposal. January 1978 began on an upbeat note. Carter began to 
reach out and bargain with the members of Congress and more actively 
recruited public support. However, despite the early optimism, 
enthusiasm for the bill d w i n d l e d . I n s t e a d  of the expected energy 
shortages, surpluses surfaced in early 1978.
In late summer the same year, the Carter compromised on the natural 
gas portion of the energy package: prices would increase by fifteen
percent and would be allowed to climb in price each year until 1985. 
Carter also began to engage in the bargaining process with the Hill in 
other ways. For the next month-and-a-half the administration 
coordinated its activities regarding the bill. Every morning, the White 
House lobbying teams met in Moore's East Wing office to plot the day's 
strategy.Since the energy crisis seemed over, the administration no 
longer tried to sell its program as the "moral equivalent of war."
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Instead the '/ftiite House adopted the stance that passage of the energy
bill would halt the recent slide of the dollar and inflation. The White
House also insisted that getting the whole package out of conference
would signal to other nations that the United States could put its ovm
house in order. Carter announced that "the entire world is looking at
our government to see whether we have the national will to deal with
this difficult challenge. If this legislation is not enacted, it will
have a devastating effect on our national image, the value of the
71dollar, our balance of trade, and inflation."
Eventually, Carter signed the five-part compromise legislation
passed on October 15, 1978— one year, six months, and nineteen days
after sending it to Capitol Hill. The energy battle with Congress ended
72up as one of the longest legislative conflicts in recent times. Even
though he signed the initiative, the bill emerged from conference 
without many points that Carter wanted.
Carter's experience with the energy proposal prompted several 
criticisms of his administration. Many perceived the Vfhite House in 
disarray. In response to these criticisms. Carter reexamined his 
organizational style. After signing into law the energy bill. Carter 
moved to reorganize his White House.
The President broadened the responsibilities of his personal 
advisor, Hamilton Jordan. Jordan coordinated the activities of the 
White House staff, thus freeing Carter to focus on more important 
matters. By April of 1978 the White House severely curtailed the 
Cabinet's authority to appoint their own subordinates. All department 
policies and speeches had to go through Jordan's and/or Stuart
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Eizenstat's office for approval. Carter also began directing people, 
who previously had unlimited access to him, to Jordan or Eizenstat.
Despite the improvements in the administration, countless 
criticisms still emanated from within the administration. These 
critiques convinced Carter that he needed to further reorganize. The 
White House therefore began to include Congress in the formation of its 
policy initiatives. However, the internal workings of the executive 
were still tumultuous.
The constant bickering between cabinet members and White House 
staffers intensified as the energy bill came out of conference in 1978. 
Several cabinet secretaries stepped up their criticisms of the White 
House and made statements contrary to Vfhite House policy. The Secretary 
of Agriculture announced higher price supports for grain than the White 
House determined necessary. The Secretary of the Treasury said there 
would be no tax reforms yet the administration was putting together 
reform p a c k a g e s . T h e  disjunction between the administration and 
cabinet thus exacerbated the disarray in the executive and alienated and 
confused the Congress. In an attempt to get the cabinet and staff 
working together, several meetings were arranged.
In a meeting between staffers and department secretaries. Jack 
Watson, the Assistant for Cabinet and Intergovernmental Affairs, 
exclaimed that "the erosion of our loyalty to each other is eroding our 
loyalty to the president. The Secretary of the Treasury, Ted
Blumenthal, disagreed, claiming that there was a big difference between 
arguing for a point and disloyalty. Carter hardly listened. Carter 
stated that he was bothered by the lack of "team spirit" and cohesion. 
Eventually, the President announced that he wanted to review many of his
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appointments and fire those who were no longer reliable. Jordan then
distributed to the cabinet secretaries and staff heads some "tough
76forms" for them to complete. They contained thirty questions for
77staff heads or cabinet secretaries to evaluate their subordinates.
Jordan stated, with Carter's approval, that he wanted each one to
evaluate their subordinates and "get rid of those who are 
73incompetent." When United Nations Ambassador. Andrew Young, 
questioned the way Jordan dealt with the issue. Carter questioned 
Young's loyalty, thus killing any meaningful comment for the rest of the 
meeting.
The Julv Massacre
Disappointed with the length of time taken to get the compromise
energy bill out of Congress, and concerned with the perception of an
ineffective administration. Carter went to Camp David to discuss with
several friends and advisors the effectiveness of his term. Since he
told everyone why he was going to Camp David, rumors ran rampant back in
Washington as several staffers wondered who might be fired. This only
exacerbated the already disorganized atmosphere in the White House.
VIhile at Camp David, many of Carter's advisors told him that he
delegated too much authority to the cabinet and that he seemed bogged
79down in the details of the administration. Carter decided to restaff 
and reorganize the White House.
On July 15, 1979, Carter delivered a televised speech to the 
nation. He stated that he had failed to lead the nation properly and as 
a result the country was in the midst of a "crisis of confidence." but
that he would restore the public's confidence in government and his
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8 0administration. Two days later. Carter demanded pro-forma 
resignations from all cabinet secretaries and senior staffers. Despite 
warnings from some inside the VJhite House that the move would seem too 
much like Nixon's demand for resignations in 1972, Carter went ahead 
with the plan. He told them that he would evaluate whose resignations 
to accept. The President eventually "accepted' the resignation of so 
many staffers and secretaries that it resulted in the largest turnover 
in the executive since 1841.81 fired half his cabinet. The White 
House turnover became known as the "July Massacre. Carter and
Jordain believed that the bold changes in the administration would 
buttress the President's image both in the eyes of the public and 
Congress. However, instead of building Carter's reputation with the 
Hill, it worked in reverse. House Majority Leader, James Wright (D- 
Tex), said the resignations demonstrated the administration's 
instability.
On July 17, the President also announced that Hamilton Jordan would
formerly become Chief of Staff. Jordan suggested to Carter a new
organizational plan. Jordan called for better cooperation between the
84White House and cabinet and better staff coordination. This 
centralization signaled Vfhite House determination to keep the 
departments and the Oval Office focused on the same goals. Jordan's 
plan signaled the rejection of cabinet government, and ended unlimited 
access to the President. Jordan coordinated policy, included staff in 
the lobbying process, settled disputes, and read and summarized staff 
memorandum. However, it was the firing of some of the most experienced 
Washington politicians reinforced the perception espoused by Wright.
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Joseph Califano and Michael Blumenthal were among the first who 
were fired. Jordan elevated the controversy over the changes when he 
said on the " MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour" about Califano's firing that 
"you don't see me crying" and added, "it's not a question of loyalty- 
-it's a question of competence."®^ Ralph Nader responded that letting 
Califano go "was like firing Mickey Mantle because he couldn't get 
along with the bat boy."®® But Carter reinforced the perception of 
disarray by stating in response to Jordan's interview that Califano had 
done an outstanding job for the administration.
The controversy over the firings prompted other appointees to
criticize the administration. In an obvious critique of Jordan's new
organizational authority. Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams stated
his "reservations about the responsiveness of those with enhanced
authority at the White House to the Congress, and the American 
87people." When Jordan heard of Brock's comment, the Treasury 
Secretary was fired. The same day James Schlesinger, the one largely 
responsible for putting together the energy package, received word the 
President had "accepted" his resignation. These high profile 
"resignations" caused the media to question Carter's stability as 
president. In the final analysis, the staff criticisms, and ultimately 
the firings, resulted from Carter's organizational approach.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION
Carter wrote in his autobiography that "there was never a moment 
when I did not consider the creation of a national energy policy equal 
in importance to any other goal we had. Thus, the administration's
failure to get the proposal they wanted reflected poorly on Carter's 
political skill. The bitter struggle with Congress left Carter without 
fond memories of the energy battle with Congress;
In looking back on the moral equivalent of war against 
energy, waste and excessive vulnerability...1 see nothing 
exhilarating. It was a bruising fight, and no final clear- 
cut victory could be photographed and hung on the wall for 
our grandchildren to admire.
His energy package capped a bitter struggle with Congress. Clearly. 
President Carter had become frustrated with the political process in 
VJashington. The final bill did not include many of the major provisions 
Carter had proposed.^ For example, the final bill did not raise as many 
taxes on various energy sources as Carter wanted. Also, the bill 
deregulated the natural gas industry while Carter wanted regulation.
Carter's image "as a bumbling legislator had become well 
established [in Congress]...by 1979."^ Since the "July Massacre" 
helped to solidify this opinion, some House Democrats began a "Dump 
Carter, Draft Kennedy movement" to challenge Carter in the primaries."
Carter's Organizational Problems and Lessons
This thesis has addressed two major questions:
1. How the management of Carter's staff affected the likelihood of 
congressional passage of legislation, and
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2. The lessons from the Carter administration are useful in
learning how to manage and organize future White House staffs.
The experience of Carter's energy bill demonstrates the important
relationship between the organization of staff and legislative success.
Without a properly managed staff, the chances a president will pass his
proposals is decreased.
The criticisms of Carter's administration focused on three
elements: (1) the Congressional Liaison Office's ineffective lobbying,
(2) Carter's mismanagement of not prioritizing his legislative agenda
for the OCR, and (3) his unwillingness to compromise.^ These criticisms
illustrate the importance of establishing good congressional relations.
VThile the constitutional relationship between the executive and
legislative branches was designed for conflict, the White House can
minimize the discord by organizing the administration before taking
office. Carter admitted he did not approach the legislature with this
constitutional reality in mind. To make matters worse he did not
realize how fragmented Congress had become after Watergate. As a
result, his approach only exacerbated the tensions between Congress and
the Oval Office. Nevertheless, he thought that he could persuade
Congress to pass his legislation by demonstrating his intellect.
Believing that knowledge of the issues would prevail over politics.
Carter neglected the liaison's office. As a result, the staff spent
7much of their time just trying to l e a m  how to do their job. The 
decentralization of power, combined with the final decision-making 
authority in the Oval Office, promoted a multitude of semi-autonomous
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fiefdonns quarreling among themselves. The disorder within the executive 
branch confused Congress as to what the President wanted.
His perception of Congress contributed to the poor relationship 
between the Hill and Vïhlte House staffers: he "felt morally superior
to the Congress-"® Carter believed that there was something 
fundamentally corrupt about the governmental Washington politics. He 
thought that national problems grew because of irresponsible legislators 
in D.C. He believed that Washington politicians were beholden to 
special interests and thus could not pass laws that were in the best 
interests of the country. According to Cyrus Vance, this contempt for 
Congress fed his hostility for the institution. For instance, when 
someone told Carter that he should slow down on the reforms he planned 
and pursue more incremental change, he replied "it's people like you 
that I've been sent to Washington to shape up.
Carter believed that only the president could act out of concern 
for the whole country. Carter said before his 1976 election that "I 
Wcint them [members of Congress] to know that we represent the same 
people. There's no one in any congressional district in the nation that 
won't be my constituent if I become president...I want to do a good job 
for them."^® This statement offended members of Congress because of 
Carter's arrogant way of stating it. Carter did not understand that 
legislators, especially after winning a tough campaign, believe that no 
one else can know their constituents and geographical area as they do.^^ 
Still, the President had firm ideas about the policies he wanted 
enacted, and therefore was always hesitant to compromise or include 
anyone in the negotiating process.
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By not appreciating the nature of Congress, the administration
failed to establish the connection necessary to increase its chances of
legislative success. Carter was not willing to work with Congress and
therefore did not gain knowledge of how they worked. By remaining
reticent throughout much of his term he failed to flatter or pressure
12them when necessary. Democrats became offended. They believed his
proposals were made at the expense of consensus within his own party.
This resentment was reinforced when Carter invited a ranking Republican
and several junior Democrat and Republican members to join him in a
signing ceremony but did not invite any of the Democratic leadership.
The President thus thought that because he had familiarized himself with
the details of the issues in the best interests of the nation. Congress
should support his programs. For example, he told Jack Nelson, the
Washington Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times, that when congressmen
came to him about certain policies, they had better know the substance
15and details of the programs because he sure did. Carter regarded his 
approach as pragmatic: if one can find the best policy, persuasion
would naturally follow, and the program would pass. He thought he could 
lead by simply being c o r r e c t . H e  advanced programs based solely on 
merit.
Carter's failure to appreciate Congress affected the way he 
organized his staff. Because the President ignored the importance of 
Congress, he did not take time to communicate with the Office of 
Congressional Relations (OCR). Because Carter did not organize his 
liaison's to bargain with the Congress, legislators believed that the 
White House did not treat them as important people in their own right. 
Administrations must have the capability of influencing Congress because
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the White House cannot claim victories for much of anything without its
consent. This political reality makes it essential for the White House
to develop a good relationship with the House and Senate. One political
science scholar stated that:
Because they [the Carter administration] did not recognize 
the importance of coalition-building through brokerage, they 
did not, at the very outset of the administration, make an 
effort to establish cooperative lobbying relationships with 
the other important participants in the legislative 
process...Since these relationships were not established, 
the White House had to rely on its own resources to obtain 
legislative success. Therefore, legislative defeats 
resulted. And these defeats fed upon themselves, creating 
the image of ineptitude, in turn has led to members of 
Congress being less willing to rely on Vfhite House judgments 
and to accept White House analysis of issues.
Carter did not understand something President Johnson practiced: the
only way to deal with Congress is "continuously, incessantly, and 
without interruption. " Rather, Carter seemed hesitant to get 
involved in the political process. Carter's liaison team did not 
attempt to discover their concerns emd failed to cultivate congressional 
support for executive proposals. Without the President's direction, the 
OCR did not know how to politic on the chief executive's behalf.
Before his loss to Ronald Reagan in the election of 1980, Carter 
acknowledged that his initial approach to Congress was wrong:
I think just a few personal moves on my part— treating 
Congress members as though they were presidents themselves, 
returning their telephone calls, letting my staff members 
respect them thoroughly, dealing with the problems that they 
presented to me, making my own presence felt in the Capitol 
building itself on occasion, would be contributions that 
might alleviate the present disharmony and total separation 
of the Vfhite House... and Congress.
Yet this realization came too late to save Carter's presidency. This 
example explains two of the earlier criticisms from the Hill: because
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he did not believe he needed to compromise with Congress, the OCR was 
left to organize itself. In essence the White House failed to make sure 
the OCR performed its duties; lobbying and communicating with Capitol 
Hill and making sure the OCR knows what the president wants and how he 
expects the liaison to carry out the job. To engage in an exchange
with Congress requires a response to congressional requests to create a
22sympathetic context for consideration of White House initiatives.
Carter eventually realized that he needed to articulate a coherent 
vision for both his staff and for the Congress. Jordan echoed this 
realization and said after the 1980 defeat that Carter should have set 
priorities and not jumped into the many issues he found important.
White House staffer Richard Harden said that they tried to do too many 
things and thus ended up not doing anything well. The Chief of Staff 
stated that advancing several policy fronts only confused the public, 
the Congress, and those inside the White House. As a result. Congress 
had to piece together the "domestic agenda with minimal White House 
impact" on the issues.^4 Many issues and proposals got lost in the 
complex and overloaded legislative process on the Hill. Without help 
from the liaison's office. White House initiatives competed for 
congressional attention with other bills introduced by members of 
Congress.
Because of the immense amount of legislation emanating from the
White House, the President's staffers spent much of their time trying to
25leam what the Chief Executive wanted accomplished. Cabinet 
secretaries tried to decipher what Carter wanted, but had "no clear 
sense of where the President was leading. The plethora of bills
emanating from the White House, and the lack of clarity regarding
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Carter's goals, greatly complicated the lobbying successes of the
administration. He added that a system to monitor projects did not
exist and that Carter did not sit down with the staff to organize them
onand lay out how the administration should work together.
The problems the administration experienced over the energy debate
also illustrates the importance of getting off to a quick and smooth
start. Stuart Eizenstat offered insight about the necessity of
"hitting the ground running": " I  don't think Carter's image ever
recovered from some of those early m i s t a k e s . P r e s i d e n t  Lyndon
Johnson's once said about the importance of the transition period that:
You've got to give it all you can that first year [and it] 
doesn't matter what kind of a majority you come with.
You've got just one year when they treat you right, and 
before they start worrying about themselves. The third year 
you lose votes...The fourth year's all politics.
Johnson understood that presidents have only one year to establish their 
effectiveness at getting legislation through Congress. The chief 
executive must be able to capitalize on the electoral success early on 
to increase legislative victories. The Carter presidency demonstrates 
what happens when chief executives approach government transition and 
management distantly.^®
On many other bills of lesser importance Carter did achieve 
victories, but the press picked up on his lack of success by stating 
that if the President did not get what he wanted, he would be perceived 
as ineffective.
Carter's attitude toward Congress explains why it took so long for 
him to leam the ropes of effectively passing legislation. The major 
flav/ resided in his unwillingness to consult members of Congress about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 6
White House proposals. For instance, he could have avoided a compromise
on the natural gas tax in the energy bill had he consulted two committee
32chairs reviewing the increases. Congress prefers consultation so they
can take credit for helping formulate the plan or avoid blame if the
proposal does not have a legislator's constituent's support.
Consultation allows legislators to affect a bill— generating ownership—
so that the representative's constituents might support a piece of
legislation. In this sense, politicians can take credit back in their
home states for helping the president formulate a good piece of
legislation. The representative or senator can gain electoral support
for the next state election. Carter did not taike into consideration the
need for legislators to protect their constituent's interests.
Consultation and bargaining also assist the president's agenda
because, once many members come on board, the VThite House has support
for its proposals. Unfortunately, Carter neglected the practice of
negotiating with Capitol Hill. Legislators thus became less willing to
rely on, and accept. White House analyses and proposals on important 
33issues.
Staffers had only a vague sense of what the administration planned 
legislatively. Carter did not develop a coherent and consistent 
strategy or relay his methodology of advancing the goals of the White 
House to the liaison staff. For a majority of the energy battle, the 
OCR was confused about their role in the legislative process. For 
example, Frank Moore said that the administration failed to define the 
internal staff procedures; therefore. Congress had no idea who to talk 
to and negotiate with.^^ He lacked salesmanship and neglected to use 
his lobbying offices to assist in the advance of his program. Declining
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to organize and enlist the OCR's assistance in forwarding the energy
package, he lacked supporters when he spoke at the joint session of
Congress on April 20.
Several members of Congress criticized Congressional Liaison, Frank
Moore, for being "poorly organized, displaying lack of knowledge and
understanding of Congress, and failing to exploit the resources
35available to the administration [through consultation]." While some
singled out Moore as a poor legislative liaison because of his
inexperience and failure to respond to the legislature's complaints.
others had no idea the administration had a congressional liaison. Well
into the second year of Carter's term, Moore invited the Democratic
leaders to meet the administration's top aides. After introducing
himself, one congressional leader asked: "Who are you?"
Some suggested that Carter appointed Moore "on the basis of his
37needs rather than on the basis of congressional needs. " Presumably,
the President chose Moore because of his desire for staff loyalty,
rather than staff competence and experience in the ways Washington
politics operated. Carter did not fill his top posts with professionals
but rather loyalists from Georgia who did not know how to advance
initiatives inside the beltway. This inexperience exacerbated the
problems with Congress. These Georgian outsiders came to Washington
rejecting the ' 'folkways of the Capital" and they made it clear to the
Democratic establishment that they were not needed.
At least one congressional aide believed that the "Georgia Mafia"
had the capability to understand the way Washington worked: "This
/ 39isn't ignorance, it's arrogance. They don't really like Congress." 
Indeed, the OCR just did not ask members of Congress if there was
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anything that they could do for them. Another aide commented that 
Moore's staff "don't seem to understand the mechanics of the art, and 
when they do figure out where to apply the pressure, it is usually too 
late. The OCR just did not keep in touch with congressional
members. They also did not dole out favors so the President would
receive favors from Capitol Hill later on. Simply put, they did not
leam to become sensitive to the legislature's needs.
Making matters worse, Ifhite House lobbyists came under criticism 
for not understanding the energy program they were dispatched to 
advance. This is not surprising considering the fact that Carter did
not involve them in its formation. When the OCR did participate late in 
1977 and early 1978, they did not have time to go over the details of 
the plan.
White House legislative programs suffered because Carter lacked the 
foresight to ensure that the OCR clearly understood how to accomplish 
its responsibilities. Carter simply believed that he could capitalize 
on the goodwill of the honeymoon period by flooding the legislature with 
several p r o p o s a l s . C o n g r e s s  rejected many of these bills because the 
OCR did not lobby or guide these proposals through the legislative 
process. Given the fact that the OCR did not properly respond to 
congressional requests for favors, the administration did not have a 
sufficient "reservoir" of goodwill that the Ifhite House could draw 
upon.^^ Thus, many legislators reacted to White House programs coolly. 
Furthermore, the OCR did not consult legislators while the White House 
formed the programs which alienated many from the legislative process. 
Carter's style made for a complex legislative agenda without
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facilitating the mechanisms to increase the likelihood of passage of 
44those programs.
Since the functioning of the staff reflects the President's style, 
the previous examples explain why Carter did not achieve what he wanted. 
While Carter's knowledge concerning details of the issues surpassed 
many, he had no idea about how his policies should go together.
When Speaker O'Neill's advised the administration to lobby for the 
energy bill, the V/hite House organized and coordinated a lobbying 
effort. As a result, the package passed more easily. Similarly in the 
Senate, even though Carter did not lobby for the issue, when he and his 
staffers organized to sell the program, the measure passed. These two 
instances illustrate that, regardless of the administration's 
inexperience, they could positively affect the outcomes of their 
proposals as long as they put together a planned effort. The 
administration finally gave the Congress what they wanted; the 
opportunity to affect White House legislation and contact with the 
administration's staffers.
Learning from his mistakes, in 1978 Carter realized the importance
45of the liaison's job. The President began to coordinate his 
initiatives with Congress and prioritize the more visible proposals. 
Carter even started to politick on his own behalf by making calls to 
members and inviting Democratic leaders to the White House to discuss 
legislation. His appointment of Jordan as Chief also displayed his 
ability to l e a m  and adjust to the political realities. However, the 
President's efforts seemed too little, too late, for by the time he 
fully instituted a new organizational structure he had little over a 
year to go in his term.
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Possible Problems with Relying on Staff
Maintaining constant communication with such staff offices as the 
OCR benefits the president in formulating policy because it airs 
differing opinions and exposes errors— thus making decisions more 
e f f e c t i v e . S i n c e  the liaison team acts as the president's eyes and 
ears on Capitol Hill, problems that might arise from legislators are 
relayed to the White House. Solving these problems makes the executive 
proposals more likely to pass.
In the modern presidency, the staffers can no longer do everything
and be knowledgeable on all issues. Because of the complexity of
governmental solutions to domestic problems, one person can no longer
advise on policy, draft legislation, or write speeches.VJhite House
staffers now act in specialized areas but this begs for VThite House
coordination since it takes more staffers to complete a job. The
problem is that this specialization of staff has the tendency to tie
staffers too closely to a certain constituency than might be the case if
there existed a more flexible method of distributing staff 
43assignments.
The risk is that a staffer who identifies and deals with one 
specific constituency constantly will identify so closely that the 
liaison ends up becoming an advocate for the interest inside the White 
House. In a sense, staffers could have the tendency to forget for whom 
they worked. James Rowe, an FDR White House aide, opposed the creation 
of a liaison office for this reason. He argued that as soon as the 
staff dealt with a congressional member's requests and complaints that
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the staffer would in effect become the employee of the legislator as
4Qwell as the president. Franklin Roosevelt somewhat echoed this
concern: if staffers failed to respond to the requests of legislators.
the members would lose confidence in the White House lobby team and
thus, either way, become ineffective.^®
Richard Neustadt once wrote President-Elect JFK urging him to "go
slow on staffing up the congressional liaison. An overorganized White
House liaison operation...tends to turn Presidential staffers into choir
boys for congressmen and bureaucrats alike. From this the president has
51more to risk than gain in my opinion." Seemingly proving Neustadt's 
point, Lawrence O'Brien came under fire for overly representing the 
interests of Congress in the Kennedy administration. In the 1980s, one 
Reagan staffer was fired for overrepresenting state and local
COgovernments against a proposed round of budget cuts. This concern has
similarities to what Nixon experienced with Watergate. As the executive
staff increases in size, they exceed the president's span of control.
The result can be detrimental for an administration as staffers may thus
53"go into business for themselves."
One way to decrease the possibility for staffer's to pursue their 
ovm agenda is to install a chief of staff. Carter could not keep up 
with the immense workload he tried to tackle. Carter eventually 
realized he needed a more hierarchical staff system "to impose order on 
policy development, guard access to the Oval Office, and settle
54administration disputes that are not of presidential importance." 
Presidents must be freed up to bargain with congressional members, meet 
with leaders from the Hill, and make phone calls. This freedom allows
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5 5the chief executive to cultivate coalitions. However, there are 
problems with this system.
Hierarchical systems do risk having too much information being 
screened by the staff chief thus leaving the president ill-informed 
about major policy issues. A good chief of staff will expose the chief 
executive to differing opinions. However, a staff chief could easily 
quell dissent in the administration and instead substitute his ovm 
proposals to the president. In some areas, then, these problems have no 
■easy solutions. In the end, the way a staff functions is a reflection 
of the president.
The Personality of the President
Jack Matson, the Assistant for Cabinet and Intergovernmental
Affairs, stated that "the way the Mhite House is organized and the way
that it functions are both very much reflections of the man."^^
Because the Constitution does so little in bestowing presidential power,
57the president must rely on his o^m personal resources. Therefore, the 
sources of success in an administration are extra-formal. Given this 
factor, no organizational flow chart can overcome a president's personal 
weaknesses.
In order for the president to g a m e r  support for his programs, he 
must have the willingness to actively pursue his goals. The most 
important characteristic in this arena is the chief executive's 
interpersonal skills. In order to persuade and manipulate others, the 
president must be able to communicate well aind use others for his ovm 
purposes. He must be active enough to be able to politick on his ovm 
behalf and compromise when the issue demands it. Many of there skills
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are difficult, to measure, but Barbara Kellerman notes that good 
political skills require good timing: the ability if the president's
initiatives to fit the mood of the moment.
Gathering support for White House programs requires a certain type 
of personality. Kellerman asserts that a good political leader must be 
an extrovert. An extrovert prefers to be in the outer world engaging 
others and being active in the environment. This type of person is 
sociable, likes to be with other people, and enjoys social activities. 
Since extroverts like to function around others, the skills one 
possesses to conduct in a social exchange with others are refined.
These social skills are a must if the president is to get his way.
A president will find it difficult to get his way if he is an 
introvert. A chief executive who prefers to be in small groups of 
intimate friends, or to be alone, will more than likely not be able to 
get what he wants. Kellerman puts Carter in this category. He liked to 
isolate himself, did not like to be out in public, had a few intimate 
friends and relied on few for advice. Since he did not pursue social 
activities, he had few allies who would lend him political support.
These introvert qualities hurt the effectiveness of his administration. 
Kellerman argues that those who are socially inadequate will find 
politics a difficult profession. In order for one to be effective, one 
must create and maintain a great number and variety of relationships; 
only the extroverted type pursues these kinds of associations.
No organizational structure will be able to overcome the personal 
inability of the chief executive. The questions of whether an 
extroverted president will organize his office in such a way that will
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increase legislative success is another question and beyond the scope of 
this thesis.
This work illustrated the problems that result from a poorly 
organized White House staff. The question of management will remain 
critical as the government increases in size. Historically, the more 
the public wants an activist presidency, the more powers and functions 
staffers assume. Given the complex problems facing society, the public 
will most likely ask for more governmental assistance. However, if the 
answer to more assistance is the increase in the staff's numbers and 
powers, there will be much debate among scholars because of the Nixon 
administration's executive excesses.
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